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Developers of products obtained through recombinant DNA
technology routinely seek patent protection for these products to re-
coup their research and development costs which are comparable to
those involved in traditional medicinal chemistry. Similar to the pre-
vious experience in chemistry, the determination of obviousness for
patentability appears to be a daunting issue for recombinant products
such as proteins, underlying DNA code, and DNA vectors which are
required for expression in recombinant organisms. This article is an
attempt to make an honest and thorough analysis of obviousness in
the recombinant field, taking into account the similarities and differ-
ences between traditional chemistry and recombinant technology. It
argues that even though recombinant products can be considered
"chemical compounds," the case law on obviousness developed for
traditional chemistry cannot be applied in all cases. The significance
of structural similarity between prior art and claimed compounds -
so important in traditional chemistry - makes little sense in relation
to recombinant products obtained by means other than molecular
modification of prior art compounds. In such cases, one should apply
the original meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103,1 rather than the rigid sub-
tests which were devised in a different context.
This article will distinguish three categories of recombinant
products including:
1. "Translation" inventions, such as naturally-occurring DNAs
retrieved from the corresponding protein, where the contribution of
the inventor resides in his use of techniques which enable the trans-
formation of prior art basic information (amino acid sequence plus
DNA library or database) into a specific DNA sequence. Because
this approach provides a unique way to systematically make useful
discoveries, this article argues that none of the obviousness analysis
developed in the chemical or mechanical arts applies. Under current
law, and despite the efforts of the Federal Circuit,2 "translation" in-
ventions are at great risk of being found obvious, as soon as the un-
derlying technology is mature.
2. "Molecular modification" inventions, such as second-
generation proteins or DNAs, obtained by incremental modifications
of the sequence. The contribution of the inventor resides in the crea-
tion de novo of at least some part of the sequence, starting from a
prior art sequence as template and substituting, adding, or subtracting
1. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
2. See infra note 43.
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elements (amino acids or nucleotides) having no autonomous func-
tional meaning. Due to similarities in their mode of conception, this
article argues that the obviousness analysis developed in the tradi-
tional chemical case law applies without major obstacles to recombi-
nant "molecular modification" inventions.
3. "Combination" inventions, such as DNA vectors or second-
generation proteins designed by combining functional domains. In
such inventions, the contribution of the inventor resides in the new
combination of prior art functional units (sequences). Due to simi-
larities in their mode of conception, the obviousness analysis devel-
oped in mechanical inventions which combines prior art functional
elements applies without major problems to recombinant
"combination" inventions.
The first section of this paper is dedicated to a brief review of
recombinant technology. Section two describes the statutory re-
quirement for nonobviousness found in § 103(a) of the Patent Act.
The development and current understanding of the standard of obvi-
ousness are explained first, followed by a review of the chemical case
law. The third section offers a typology of recombinant inventions.
This section successively describes "translation" inventions,
"molecular modification" inventions, and "combination" inventions,
as well as the relevant case law.
I. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 3
Recombinant technology represents the paradigm of modem
biotechnology and remains its main tool. All living entities obey a
"program" (not unlike a computer operating system) encoded on a
universal chemical support: DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid. 4 The
basic idea of recombinant technology is to take advantage of this
common denominator by placing functional units of the DNA
"program" - genes - from a complex, poorly understood, expen-
sive, or rights-bearing organism (such as man) into a simple, thor-
oughly studied, cheap, or rights-deprived organism (such as bacteria,
yeast, cells, or non-human mammals). This approach has yielded
several invaluable therapeutic products, such as Factor VIII, erythro-
3. For a general background on molecular biology, see PAUL BERG & MAXINE SINGER,
DEALING wrrH GENES: THE LANGUAGE OF HEREDITY (1992); JAMES D. WATSON ET AL.,
RECOMBINANT DNA: A SHORT COURSE (1983); JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE GENE (4th ed. 1987).
4. Some viruses (e.g., HIV) use RNA (ribonucleic acid), instead of DNA. RNA is
chemically very close to DNA. Both are collectively known as nucleic acids.
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poietin, human growth hormone, tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA),
granulocyte colony-stimulating factor (G-CSF), and hepatitis B vac-
cine, among many others. All are mass-produced replicas of natural
proteins, previously available from living organisms only in minute
quantities. In addition, recombinant technology has already started to
produce enhanced versions of natural proteins called second-
generation proteins.
Contained in one or several chromosomes, DNA represents the
chemical support for virtually all the information necessary to the
living cell.' As such, DNA must be very stable during the life time of
the living organism.6 DNA consists of a long polymeric chain of
only four chemical building blocks (bases) called adenine, thymine,
guanine, and cytosine respectively abbreviated as A, T, G, and C.
The order of these bases (sequence) determines the information con-
tained in the DNA. The relevant information7 encoded in DNA is
transmitted to other informational molecules (RNA or protein). In
addition, some DNA information is used (read) directly on the DNA
as signals indicating the beginning and the end of functional units, or
as regulatory signals for transmission of nearby information to other
molecules.'
Downstream transmission of the information contained in DNA
is done by transcription of DNA into RNA. The latter is another
polymeric chain, chemically very close to DNA, which uses the same
chemical building blocks, except that thymine (T) is replaced by
uracil (U). 9 Most RNAs are only messengers of the information
contained in DNA, hence its name messenger RNA (mRNA). They
transmit the information further downstream, by translation into pro-
tein (see Figure 1). Other RNAs are directly used as effectors for
various cellular tasks, such as assisting the translation of mRNA into
protein (transfer RNA (tRNA) and ribosomal RNA (rRNA)).
5. The basic functional unit of life is the cell. Organisms can be unicellular (bacterias,
yeasts, protozoas, some mushrooms) or pluricellular (superior organisms). All cells composing
a given pluricellular organism contain the same DNA information.
6. Variations occur either during recombination between two individuals (sexual or
asexual) or accidentally (mutations).
7. In superior organisms, a great proportion of DNA (about 95% in man) does not con-
vey information and is not transcripted into RNA. The role of this DNA, if any, is poorly un-
derstood. See supra note 3.
8. See id.
9. In addition, RNA and DNA also differ by the sugar residues attached to each base.
RNA uses ribose, and DNA uses deoxyribose.
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Fig. 1 Transmission of information from DNA to protein (from
Paul Berg, Dealing with Genes -the Language of Heredity, Uni-
versity Science Books, Sausalito, California 63 (1992)).
Messenger RNAs are intended to be translated into proteins.
Proteins are also polymeric chains but are chemically very different
from both DNA and RNA. Whereas nucleic acids have only four
bases, proteins have 20 different building blocks, called amino acids.
Accordingly, the translation pattern from RNA into proteins is not as
straightforward as the transcription from DNA into RNA where one
base corresponds to its complementary base. This translation pattern,
called genetic code, was elucidated during the 1950s and 1960s.10 To
code for as many as 20 different amino acids, the four bases of DNA
and RNA have to be combined into words of at least three letters."
Groups of 3 bases, called codons, code for each amino acid. The
number of possible codons, which can possibly be formed with a
four-letter alphabet (43 = 64) exceeds the number of natural amino
acids (20). As a result, most amino acids are coded by two or more
codons, and the only role of several codons is to signal the end of
translation.' 2 This relative loss of information from DNA to protein
10. F.H.C. Crick, The Genetic Code, Sc. AM., Oct. 1962, at 66.
II. One-letter words of a four-letter alphabet (A, T, G, and C) would encode only 4
amino acids; whereas two-letter words would encode only 16 amino acids (42).
12. Codons TAA, TAG, TGA. In addition, one codon (ATG) codes for an amino acid
(methionine) as well as signals the beginning of translation.
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is generally referred to as the "degeneracy of the genetic code" (see
Figure 2).
Amino acid
Fig. 2 The genetic code (from Paul Berg, Dealing with Genes
the Language of Heredity, University Science Books, Sausalito,
California 64 (1992)).
The amino acid sequence of proteins, also called primary struc-
ture, defines their three-dimensional shape. Although the amino acid
sequence is linear in itself, the specific pattern of amino acids directs
the intramolecular interactions to define the ultimate molecular
shape. Protein folding - called secondary structure - encompasses
either a helicoidal disposition, called a-helix, or a flat disposition,
called B-sheet. Beyond these gross shapes, the protein undergoes
further folding to reach its tertiary structure, approximately globular
in shape. Once in its tertiary structure, a protein bears one or more
"functional domains" able to interact with other molecules, thereby
conferring chemical properties on the protein.
Proteins are certainly the most important effectors in living
cells; their tasks are too diverse to enumerate. This article will de-
scribe only broad categories. One functional category of proteins is
structural. 3 Comparable to cement or concrete used in construction,
these proteins give physical cohesion to living organisms at both
cellular and macroscopic levels. A second functional category of
proteins consists of catalysts for virtually all chemical reactions tak-
13. Examples of structural proteins include tubulin (cytoskeleton), collagen (bones, ten-
dons, skin), and elastin (ligaments, tendons, skin).
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ing place in the living cell. Known under the generic name of en-
zymes, these proteins are ubiquitous and extremely diverse. They
play a key role in all chemical reactions necessary to metabolism, as
well as in the processes of transcription and translation described
above. A third functional category of proteins carry out intercellular
communications. Examples of proteins in this category include
growth hormone, insulin, ACTH, vasopressine, interleukines, inter-
ferons, and G-CSF. While the proteins just described are located in
the extracellular space and transmit signals between cells, other pro-
teins involved in intercellular communication are bound to the cellu-
lar surface. Known under the generic term of receptors, they transmit
signals from outside the cell to the relevant intracellular structure. In
addition to binding endogenous hormones and cytokines, receptors
are the main target of drugs. The final functional category of pro-
teins helps an organism defend itself against foreign aggressions.
Membrane-bound or free in the extracellular space, these proteins,
called antibodies, play a major role in immunity.
All proteins can potentially be found in, and purified from, ex-
isting organisms. However, the quantities present in organisms are
usually very small, resulting in both high purification costs and sup-
ply problems. In addition, purification issues, such as unwanted viral
contamination, commonly occur. 14
The advent of recombinant technology has provided a solution
to these problems.' s By inserting the DNA information encoding a
desired protein into certain simple or well-studied cells or organisms,
the scientist can direct the latter to produce the protein in great quan-
tities, at low cost, and in a form easily amenable to purification. This
process has been a focus of biotechnology since its inception.
Before one can insert DNA or a gene into a given cell or organ-
ism, it must be in the form of a molecule or its DNA sequence must
be known. The traditional way to obtain the sequence is to start from
a known protein with a defined biologic function and proceed up-
stream to the DNA (gene) encoding it. All genes which correspond
to proteins currently produced by recombinant means were obtained
by this approach.
14. The unfortunate example of Factor VIII extracted from a blood donor and used to
treat hemophilia while contaminated with HIV is still vivid. See generally Andrew Rosenthal,
Blood, Money, and AIDS: Hemophiliacs Are Split; Liability Cases Bogged Down in Disputes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1996, at Dl.
15. Another approach, involving the total chemical synthesis of proteins, could eliminate
the purification issue but not the cost problem.
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Initially, this approach involves purifying and sequencing the
protein in order to determine its partial or complete amino acid se-
quence. Once the latter is known, one can devise and synthesize cor-
responding partial DNA sequences based on the translation pattern of
the genetic code.16 In order to take into account the degeneracy of the
genetic code, multiple DNA sequences - all encoding the partial
amino acid sequence in question-must be synthesized. While
these short DNA sequences do not contain enough information to en-
code the complete protein, they may be used as probes to definitively
isolate the complete DNA sequence from a DNA library. DNA li-
braries contain either the total DNA existing in a cell (gDNA)17 or the
DNA transcripted into mRNA along with the encoding for proteins
(cDNA).' 8 The latter is much smaller than the former as well as eas-
ier to work with. The short DNA probes are then labeled with a ra-
dioisotope and added to the DNA library. By way of base comple-
mentarity in a process called hybridization, the probe corresponding
to the correct, full-length DNA in the library will "stick" to and lo-
calize the DNA. The DNA is then inserted in a suitable vector for
production of the desired protein in a simple, or well-studied, host
cell or organism as mentioned above.19 A vector is generally a cir-
cular piece of DNA (plasmid) containing all additional sequences re-
quired to express the desired gene in a given cell. A typical bacterial
plasmid contains the sequences illustrated below (see Figure 3).
16. For economic and practical reasons, typically only a short DNA sequence
(oligonucleotide) is synthesized. The length required for unambiguous matching is determined
by the size of the DNA library in which the DNA sequences will be used as probes.
17. gDNA stands for genomic DNA; the genome being the entire DNA component of a
cell.
18. cDNA stands for complementary DNA. It refers to the method used to make the li-
brary; starting from mRNA and making complementary DNAs by reverse transcription. The
distinction between gDNA and cDNA is relevant to superior organisms, for whom genomic
DNA is only partially transcribed into RNA due to the presence of introns (non-coding regions
of DNA). For lower organisms such as yeast, the distinction is not relevant since most
genomic DNA is transcribed into RNA (no introns).
19. The host cell is generally a bacteria, yeast, or other isolated cell. In some cases how-
ever, a whole multicellular organism is used for expression of recombinant proteins. This in-
volves specific techniques called transgenic technology.
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TST TGA
Figure 3. Schematic representation of a plasmid.
ORI : Sequence directing the cell to replicate the plasmid itself (binding-
site for DNA polymerase).
PROM: Sequence directing the cell to initiate transcription into RNA
(binding-site for RNA polymerase).
ATG : Start codon, indicating the beginning of translation into protein.
SEQ : Inserted protein sequence.
TGA : Stop codon, indicating the end of translation into protein (TAA,
TAG is also possible).
TST : Transcription stop, sequence directing the cell to end transcription
into RNA (releasing-site for RNA polymerase).
SEL : Marker for the cell (usually antibiotic susceptibility).
The protein sequence excepted, a functional plasmid sequence
must be compatible with the expression system (cell or bacteria) in
question. Plasmids are sometimes engineered to have compatibility
with multiple expression systems or with other customized features.
As a result, innumerable different plasmids are conceivable depend-
ing on their intended purpose.
The approach to recombinant technology just described pro-
ceeds upstream from a known protein to an unknown gene. Recent
technology, developed in the context of NIH's Human Genome Proj-
ect, proceeds inversely: from a known gene to an unknown protein.
By systematically sequencing all the human genome, or all cDNA
contained in given cDNA libraries, this approach has already re-
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vealed the complete DNA sequence of thousands of previously un-
known genes. However, knowledge of the DNA sequence alone does
not explain the biologic function of the corresponding protein. The
only way to determine the biologic function - cloning the thousands
of retrieved sequences and examining the properties of the corre-
sponding proteins-is certainly not feasible. Although indirect
remedies will be devised, an information gap persists between the se-
quence of the genes and their function. 20 Nevertheless, once com-
plete, the sequencing of the human genome will greatly simplify the
hybridization step required by the traditional protein to gene ap-
proach. Indeed, it will replace the actual hybridization of DNA
probes by a mere computer search; enabling comparison of the DNA
sequences deduced from the known protein with the sequences of the
whole genome or sequences contained in selected cDNA libraries.
The techniques mentioned above were developed to produce
natural proteins in sufficient quantities in a cost-effective way. As
such, natural proteins may make excellent drugs. However, despite
their long evolution, natural proteins sometimes have drawbacks
from a therapeutic or pharmacological point of view. For example,
their pharmacological half-life might be too short or their potency in-
sufficient for the treatment of a specific disease. As a result, protein
chemists now try to devise second-generation proteins that are better
suited for the intended purpose.
Two distinct approaches can be taken for designing second-
generation proteins. First, minor modifications can be made in the
sequence of the natural protein obtain a new protein with only one or
a few substituted amino acids. This can be done by site-directed
mutagenesis, a technique by which one can perform point mutations
at the DNA level which are translated to the protein.21 The other ap-
proach to second-generation protein design involves the addition of
functional domains originating in other proteins to first-generation
20. This same gap renders the patentability of such "anonymous" DNA sequences ques-
tionable on utility grounds. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
21. Mark J. Zoller & Michael Smith, Oligonucleotide-directed Mutagenesis Using M13-
Derived Vectors: An Efficient and General Procedure for the Production of Point Mutations in
any Fragment of DNA, 10 NUCLEIC AciDS REs. 6487, 6487 (1982). Methods of site directed
mutagenesis include the system of Zoller and Smith using single stranded DNA and of Mori-
naga using heteroduplexed DNA. Id. at 6487. See also Yasushi Morinaga et al., Improvement
of Oligonucleotide-Directed Site-Specific Mutagenesis Using Double-Stranded Plasmid DNA,
BIO/TECHNOLOGY, July 1984, at 636. The new protein can also be obtained by total chemical
synthesis of the modified protein, albeit at a cost probably incompatible with commercializa-
tion. R.B. Merryfield, Solid-Phase Peptide Synthesis I. The Synthesis of a Tetrapeptide, 85 J.
AM. CHEMIcAL Soc'y 2149 (1963).
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proteins. As a result, the new protein bears properties derived from
both original proteins. Not yet a practical reality, such an endeavor
requires a prior determination of the significance of functional do-
mains, and identification of their amino acid and DNA sequences.22
I. OBVIOUSNESS AND THE CHEMICAL ART
To be patentable, an invention is required by the Patent Act to
be useful, novel, and nonobvious233 These three material conditions
apply to a whole range of inventions covered by utility patents. The
last of these conditions, nonobviousness, is without contest one of the
most difficult concepts in patent law. The historical development of
the standard has been conflicting and confusing and remains so to-
day, although to a lesser extent. In addition, the nature of the chemi-
cal and biotechnology arts render the application of the standard for
nonobviousness especially challenging.
A. Historical Developments and Current Standard
Under the original Patent Act of 1793, utility and novelty were
the only material requirements for patentability. In subsequent Patent
Acts from 1836 to 1952, a procedural provision indirectly suggested
that something more than only novelty and usefulness was required
for patentability. In this provision, the Act directed the Commis-
sioner of Patents to issue a patent on an invention if the Commis-
sioner deemed it to be sufficiently useful and important. 4 For rea-
sons that are unclear, courts never relied on this provision in their
decisions, even when the facts could have supported it.21
As early as 1825, defendants in infringement cases began to ar-
gue that an invention could not be patented merely because it was
new and useful, as stated in the Act. In Earl v. Sawyer,26 the court
vehemently denied that anything more than novelty and usefulness
was necessary to obtain a patent. The patent involved a shingle
sawmill using a circular saw, whereas prior art shingle mills used
perpendicular saws. In a clear-sighted statement, Justice Story said,
"I am utterly at loss to give any other interpretation of the Act; and,
22. The task is complicated by the fact that functional domains are sometimes composed
from non-adjacent regions.
23. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
24. Law of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 120 (1836) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
25. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
26. Earl v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cass. 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247).
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indeed, in the very attempt to make that more cear,... there is dan-
ger of creating an artificial obscurity .... 27
However, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,28 an 1851 infringement
case, the Supreme Court decided otherwise, holding that patentability
required something more demanding than only novelty and useful-
ness. 29 The invention concerned a porcelain doorknob whose inven-
tive shape was disclosed in the prior art. The only difference was
that prior art doorknobs were made of metal instead of porcelain:
unless more ingenuity and skill were required... than were pos-
sessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which
constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words,
the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of
the inventor.30
After Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, Justice Story's prophecy was re-
alized: the law became obscure. The amorphous test described in the
case took various names - inventive novelty, invention, nonobvi-
ousness - and was applied in conflicting ways during the following
century. During the final period of the evolution that occurred before
the Patent Act of 1952, courts, and especially the Supreme Court,
gradually became exceedingly severe in applying the standard for
nonobviousness. Deviling the monopolistic aspect of patents, the
Supreme Court went as far as to require a "flash of inventive genius"
from the inventor before granting a patent.31
The Patent Act of 1952 was enacted by Congress partly in reac-
tion to these increasingly stringent requirements. Section 103(a) on
nonobviousness was intended to codify the principles spelled out in
various judicial decisions32 and was considered as one of the most
important aspects of the new Patent Act.33
27. Id. at 255. For historical events that occurred before Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, see
JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 5.03 (1995).
28. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
29. Id. at 256. According to Harold C. Wegner, the Supreme Court received inspiration
for this doctrine from George Tickemor Curtis' 1849 original treatise on patents. HAROLD C.
WEGNER, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTICALS 220 (2d. ed.
1994).
30. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248,266 (1851).
31. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941)
(thermostat-controlled cigarette lighter when both thermostat and lighter were in separate prior
art references). See also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147 (1950) (cashier's counter using known mechanical elements).
32. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
33. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong. (1952) reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,2397.
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Still valid today, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) reads as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identi-
cally disclosed or described as set forth in § 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived
by the manner the invention was made.34
Unlike previous Patent Acts, § 103(a) clearly states that some-
thing more demanding than novelty is required for patentability. The
second sentence also provides that the requirement should not go too
far, rebuking the "flash of genius" requirement the Supreme Court
adopted in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.3 5 or
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.36
The meaning of § 103 was later clarified in 1966 by the Supreme
Court in its landmark case Graham v. John Deere Co. which involved
an improved chisel plow. 37 The Court held that even though the
question of patent validity is one of law, the test of obviousness re-
quires some "basic factual inquiries."38 The test was spelled out as
follows:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to
be determined; differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordi-
nary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this back-
ground, the obviousness or the nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined.39
The Court said, "[s]uch secondary consideration as commercial
success, long felt but unresolved needs, failure of others, etc., might
be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origins
34. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West. Supp. 1996). As of November 1, 1995, § 103 was di-
vided into three subsections. Sectionl03(a) is identical to the former first paragraph and pro-
vides the general test for obviousness, valid for all types of inventions. Sectionl03(b) was en-
acted in 1995 in reaction to the PTO's excessive interpretation in In re Durden (763 F.2d 1406
(Fed. Cir. 1985)) in biotechnology process cases. Pertaining exclusively to processes, § 103(b)
is not relevant to our discussion of recombinant products. Id. at 1410. Section 103(c) is iden-
tical to the former second paragraph of § 103, enacted in 1984. Mostly defining prior art for
the purposes of § 103, § 103(c) is not relevant to our discussion.
35. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
36. 340 U.S. 174 (1950). Section 103 was enacted only two years after GreatAtlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.
37. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 17.
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of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obvious-
ness, these inquiries may have relevancy." 40
The "may" in the last sentence can now be safely removed. The
Federal Circuit has held several times that objective evidence of non-
obviousness - the so-called secondary considerations in Graham -
must always be taken into account and not only in those cases where
a doubt remains. 41 The list of admissible objective evidence of non-
obviousness has been gradually completed by the Federal-Circuit and
now includes commercial success, long-felt need, failure of others,
unexpected results, evidence of copying, skepticism in the profession,
licensing, and laudatory statements by an infringer.42
Despite the enactment of § 103 and Graham, the law of nonob-
viousness remained confused. Much debate arose about whether the
new Act had changed the law or was only a codification of judicial
precedents. The various circuits kept applying conflicting standards,
notably for inventions involving a combination of old elements.4 3
These inconsistencies certainly contributed to the creation in 1982 of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."4
The clarification of the controversy regarding combination in-
ventions counts among the first accomplishments of the Federal Cir-
cuit. For many decades, the Supreme Court had applied a special
rule for inventions involving the combination of old elements.45 The
rule was that for a combination invention to be nonobvious the whole
had to exceed, in some way, the sum of its parts. Lower courts had
trouble consistently applying this "synergistic results" rule for the
good reason that virtually all inventions can be considered as the
40. Id. at 17-18.
41. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (1986)
(sandwich-type immunoassay using monoclonal antibodies). "Objective evidence is not
merely icing on the cake." Id. at 1380.
42. Robert Merges has legitimately criticized the use of commercial success and other
objective evidence of nonobviousness (except for the failure of others) as rewarding marketing
and other business-related skills more than significant technical advances. Robert P. Merges,
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation., 76 CAL. L,
REv. 803 (1988).
43. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENT, § 5.04 [5] (1996).
44. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in good part to achieve uni-
formity in the application of patent law. Regional doctrinal variation among the various cir-
cuits of its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, had led to legal insecurity
and forum shopping. Practically, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in
patent cases.
45 See Hailes v. Van Wormer, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 353 (1874); Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Anderson's Black Rock Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
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combination of old elements. In 1983, the Federal Circuit clearly
rejected the rule as being "unnecessary and confusing."46 As a result,
the fact that an invention is a combination of known elements is not
relevant to its patentability -only the prior art suggestion or moti-
vation to make the combination is.47
In addition, it is useful to mention the notion of "prima facie ob-
viousness" developed by the Federal Circuit principally in chemical
and biotechnological cases. 48 It is essentially a procedural tool, used
to reverse the burden of proof on the applicant in obviousness cases.
The PTO bears the initial burden of proof in establishing a case of
prima facie obviousness. It must show "some objective teaching in
the prior art or knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill
in the art that would lead that individual to combine the relevant
teachings of the references." 49 After the PTO has made this demon-
stration the applicant can rebut the case of prima facie obviousness
with convincing evidence. This generally amounts to a demonstra-
tion of some unexpected result or surprising property in the inven-
tion.50
B. Obviousness of Chemical Compounds
According to Donald Chisum, "claims for chemical compounds
present unique problems in applying the standard of non-obviousness
or invention. Because of the unpredictable nature of chemical reac-
tions, a newly-synthesized compound may be very similar in struc-
ture to known existing compounds and yet exhibit very different
properties." 51 It is useful to discuss the reasons underlying both these
unique problems and the unpredictability of chemical reactions.
46 Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
See also Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
47 See, e.g., Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
48 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1992). According to the Federal Cir-
cuit in In re Oetiker, the notion of prima facie obviousness is not limited to chemical practice.
Experience shows that it is used mostly in that field. Id. at 1446. Although the issue had been
implicitly reached in In re Papesch and other cases previous to the advent of the Federal Cir-
cuit, they do not generally refer to the term "prima facie" obviousness. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d
381,386 (C.C.P.A 1963).
49. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468 (Fed. Cir.1984).
50. For developments on the notion of prima facie obviousness, see ROBERT L. HARMON,
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 110-12 (2d. ed. 1991). In chemistry, see infra Part II.B.2;
KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BiOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CiRCUIT 91-95 (1995); and Hel-
mut A. Wegner, Prima Facie Obviousness of Chemical Compounds, 6 AMER. PAT. L. ASS'N
Q. J. 271 (1978).
51. DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 5.04[6] (1995) (footnotes omitted).
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When it first appeared as a technology, chemistry was unique in
that the underlying mechanisms, occurring on a molecular scale,
could only be assessed indirectly by techniques revealing the ongoing
molecular process. Much of the chemical art that which evolved
during the last 250 years amounted to improving this indirect assess-
ment of chemical properties. When they occur in simple systems,
such as test tubes, most chemical reactions are now well understood,
and fairly predictable. The chemist can accurately foresee what
compound(s) will be obtained as a result of a given reaction, what
energy level is involved, as well as other specifications. Similarly,
the chemist is able to predict some basic properties of the compounds
placed in simple systems, such as physicochemical properties, and
indirect assessment is sufficiently accurate to avoid a fracture be-
tween the structure and the function of the compounds. The unique
problems and unpredictable nature of chemical reactions described
by Chisum are not results of the mechanics of chemical reactions be-
cause these reactions are well understood in simple systems. The
determination of obviousness in such cases should be comparable to
any mechanical invention.
However, chemical compounds are generally intended for use in
highly complex systems, such as living systems. The indirect chemi-
cal or biochemical assessment of the reactions taking place in such
systems is generally incomplete. Due to the complexity of such sys-
tems, a fracture appears between the structure and the properties of
the compounds. As a result, the properties of chemical compounds
are generally considered as unpredictable.52 Thus, the strategies and
methods for making chemical inventions are different from those
used for mechanical inventions. An inventor of a mechanical device
can directly envision the structure he needs to solve his problem and
can then proceed to invent using known elements with independent
mechanical significance.
However, due to the complexity of the systems in which chemi-
cal compounds are to be used, the chemist cannot directly envision
what structure will confer upon his compound the desired property.
52. Similarly, when the preparation of a product, and not only its effects or properties,
involves such a complex system - like biotechnology-the process of obtaining the com-
pound is entached with the same unpredictability. This is the source of a criterion often cited
in biotechnology obviousness cases: the reasonable expectation of success (see supra Part
II.B.1). On the other hand, being an inquiry into living systems, the very activity of biotech-
nology tends to challenge the presumption of their unpredictability - notably when thoroughly
studied systems are involved (such as E. coli, yeast, or others).
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Instead, one must start from a known compound.53 Although the
structure-function relationship of chemical compounds is far from
being fully understood, its very existence is well established. In
comparable systems, structurally similar compounds generally have
similar or related properties. Building on this knowledge, the chem-
ist incrementally modifies the prior art compound by adding or sub-
tracting chemical radicals54 having no independent chemical signifi-
cance or function. By improving the odds of designing useful
compounds, this strategy of "molecular modification" confers some
predictability to an otherwise random process. Thus, in the process
of molecular modification, the prior art provides the skilled person
with suggestions or motivation to make a compound. In this context
the determination of obviousness should involve different subtests
depending on the subject matter at hand.
In a long line of cases relating to obviousness of chemical com-
pounds, courts have tried to articulate the strategy of molecular modi-
fication with the unpredictability of structure-function relationships.
The case law is very technical and sometimes conflicting. Some
cases deal with prima facie obviousness of chemical compounds
whereas others deal with ultimate obviousness.55 Some cases analyze
whether a given structural analogy is sufficient to trigger the pre-
sumption of obviousness. Others evaluate the ability of unexpected
properties to rebut it. Still other cases establish what beyond struc-
tural similarity is needed to trigger a prima facie case. Eventually, all
cases attempt to balance the apparent obviousness of structurally
similar compounds with the apparent nonobviousness of their unpre-
dictable properties. The Federal Circuit recently summarized the law
of chemical obviousness in its much debated 6 en bane rehearing of
53. The chemist can also make random compounds, relying on serendipity, but this ap-
proach is inefficient. Serendipity-a term commonly used in medicinal chemistry-means
accidental discovery.
54. Chemical radicals are small parts of molecules ubiquitously found in organic mole-
cules. Methyl (-CH,-) is a typical radical.
55. The nuance between both notions has often been overlooked by authors and courts.
Although the material legal issues are similar in both situations, the procedural consequences
for the applicant are very different. If the latter can avoid a finding of prima facie obviousness,
his invention is patentable without further inquiry. If, inversely, his invention is found prima
facie obvious, the applicant must rebut the presumption - most often with costly comparative
studies of prior art and new compounds.
56. See the vehement dissenting opinion by Judge Newman, joined by Judges Cowen
and Mayer. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en bane). See also Margaret M.
Wall & Justin Dituri, The En Banc Rehearing of ln Re Dillon: Policy Consideration and Im-
plicationsfor Patent Prosecution, 68 DENV. U. L. REv. 261 (1991).
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In re Dillon.57
Rather than describing the chronological evolution of the case
law, which is often illogical, this article will describe the steps cur-
rently required for determining the obviousness of chemical com-
pounds. The relevant past case law relating to each step in the re-
spective sections will be mentioned.
The first step is carried out by the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), or the court, and consists of deciding whether or not the com-
pound is prima facie obvious. This concept is based on the assump-
tion that structurally similar compounds have similar properties and
that the disclosure of a compound having some utility in the prior art
provides the suggestion to make analogs.
Three conditions must be satisfied for a finding of prima facie
obviousness:
(a) Structural similarity between claimed and prior art com-
pounds;
(b) Prior art suggestion or motivation to make the new com-
pound;58
(c) A method of making the claimed compound is disclosed
in, or rendered obvious by, the prior art (enabling disclo-
sure).
If any one of the above conditions is not satisfied, the compound
is deemed nonobvious and patentable without further inquiry.5 9 If all
three conditions are met, the compound is deemed prima facie obvi-
ous. The applicant can then, in a second step, rebut the presumption
of obviousness by showing either that the court or the PTO had im-
properly concluded that all conditions for a prima facie case were
met or that the new compound has unexpected properties when com-
pared to the prior art. See Table 1.
57. In re Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1989); 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
58. Until 1971, the law was unclear as to whether the second element was required for a
finding of prima facie obviousness. Structural similarity alone was seemingly considered as
being a sufficient motivation to make the analog. In re Stemninsky clearly held that suggestion
or motivation was a distinct requirement from structural similarity. In re Stemninsky, 444 F.2d
581 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
59. "Because we reverse on the basis of failure to establish a prima facie case of obvi-
ousness, we need not reach the issue of the sufficiency of the showing of unexpected results."
In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (method of inhibiting corrosion of metallic
parts in water cooling systems).
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TYPE OF STATUTORY DIS- INVENTION IS FACTOR USUALLY
INVENTION POSITION AP- "OBVIOUS TO A REDEEMING
PLICABLE SKILLED PERSON" IF PATENTABILITY
PRIOR ART PROVIDES ("PRIMA FACIE"
("PRIMA FACIE" REBUTFAL)
OBVIOUSNESS)
Chemical compounds 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Structurally similar Unexpected properties
(traditional "A patent may not be compound(s) in the new compound
chemistry) obtained.., if + or
the ... subject mat- motivation to make no proper similarity,
ter... would have the new compound motivation, or disclo-
been obvious to a per- (i.e., some useful sure
son having ordinary property in the prior
skill in the art ... " art compound)
+
enabling disclosure of
a method to make the
new compound
Table 1. Obviousness of chemical compounds.
1. Prima Facie Obviousness of Chemical Compounds
a. Sufficient Structural Similarity
It is impossible to determine in the abstract what constitutes suf-
ficient structural closeness of compounds for prima facie obviousness
purposes. It depends intimately upon whether the assertion that
similar compounds have similar properties is true for the class of
compounds at stake. This can be done only on a case by case basis.
Most of the early chemical case law dealt with this question of
structural obviousness - examining a wide range of classes of or-
ganic compounds. The doctrine establishing the relevance of struc-
tural similarity to chemical obviousness was first spelled out in In re
Hass60 and In re Henze.61 In both cases, prior art and claimed com-
pounds were structurally very close (chemical homologues 62). Many
other cases have shown that other structural similarities can serve as
grounds for prima facie obviousness.63 Nevertheless, as the Federal
60. In re Hass, 141 F. 2d 127 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (nitroolefins).
61. In re Henze, 181 F. 2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (anti-convulsant hydantoins).
62. Chemical homologues are serial compounds differing only by a group (-C-I,-).
63. Adjacent and non-adjacent homologues, aliphatic isomers, N-alkyl substituted
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Circuit held in In re Grabiak, "generalization should be avoided inso-
far as specific chemical structures are alleged to be prima facie obvi-
ous one from the other."64 Indeed, in Grabiak and other cases, the
initial PTO finding of prima facie obviousness was reversed precisely
because the claimed compounds lacked sufficient structural similarity
with the compounds in the prior art.65 In such cases, the prior art and
the structure of claimed compounds were found to be too different to
verify the assertion of similar properties. Although rebutting a prima
facie obviousness determination most often involves a showing of
unexpected properties in the new compounds,6 such cases demon-
strate that the same may be accomplished by showing that the prior
art and claimed compounds are in fact not sufficiently similar.
b. Prior Art Suggestion or Motivation to Make the
New Compound
In early cases, structural similarity appeared sufficient to con-
stitute prima facie obviousness. 67 In other words, the very disclosure
of a chemical compound was considered a sufficient motivation to
make analogs- independent of any other concern. However, this
reasoning was questionable since it could be applied to molecular
modifications performed on any of the innumerable chemical com-
pounds disclosed in the art. In Stemninsky the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA) found that prior art disclosure of a structural
analog alone was insufficient to provide real motivation to make a
new compound. 68 The applicant claimed a tin composition useful in
lubricants as an antioxidant - the prior art analog compositions had
no known utility. The court decided that without a known utility for
amines, alkylated aromatic compounds, aromatic position, aliphatic position isomers, ethers,
esters of prior art alcohols, reverse esters, halogen analogs, and chalkogens have sometimes
been considered by the PTO, or the courts, as sufficiently similar in structure to trigger a prima
facie obviousness case. For details about this very technical aspect of chemical patent law, see
Helmut A. Wegner, Prima Facie Obviousness of Chemical Compounds, 6 Am. PAT. L. ASS'N
Q.J. 271 (1978) and HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, CHEMICALS &
PHARMACEUTICALS 278 (2d. ed. 1994) (both references cite relevant cases).
64. In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729, 731 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (claimed thioester and prior art
ester useful as herbicidal safeners).
65. See, e.g., In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038
(Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Grose, 592 F.2d 1161
(C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Taborsky, 502 F.2d 775 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Elpem, 362 F.2d 762
(C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Mills, 281 F.2d 218 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
66. See infra Part II.B.2.
67. See, e.g., In re Riden, 318 F.2d 761 (C.C.P.A. 1963); In re Henze, 181 F.2d 196
(C.C.P.A. 1950).
68. In re Stemninsky, 444 F.2d 581 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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the prior art compounds, the applicant had no reason or motivation to
synthesize the claimed analogs. It was also immaterial that the prior
art compounds actually had these properties since they were un-
known at the time of invention. Accordingly, the new compounds in
Stemninsky were deemed nonobvious and patentable. A subsequent
line of cases confirmed Stemninsky.69 The conclusion of these cases
is that some utility for the prior art compound is required in order to
give the skilled person a general motivation to make analogs. 70 Only
then can the new compound be deemed prima facie obvious. The
court in In re Gyurik properly summarized the situation:
An element in determining obviousness of a new chemical
compound is the motivation of one having ordinary skill in the art
to make it. That motivation is not abstract, but practical, and is al-
ways related to the properties or uses one skilled in the art would
expect the compound to have, if made.71
Finally, the Federal Circuit refined the theory in its en banc re-
hearing of In re Dillon.72 The applicant claimed a composition of
hydrocarbon fuel and tetra-orthoester producing less soot during
combustion; the prior art disclosed the use of tri-orthoesters in fuel
for dewatering purposes and of tetra-orthoesters as water scavengers
in hydraulic fluids. The court found that the properties disclosed in
the prior art analogs (dewatering and water scavenging) were suffi-
cient to motivate the applicant to make her analogous composition,
even though the claimed property (reduced soot emission) was not
suggested in the references. In other words, the Federal Circuit de-
cided that the inquiry regarding the properties of prior art com-
pounds, done for the purposes of establishing motivation,73 was dis-
tinct and independent from the inquiry concerning unexpected
69. See, e.g., In re Gyurik, 596 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding the anthelminthic
process of a structural analog not obvious from use as an intermediate in a reaction). See also
In re Lalu, 747 F.2d 703 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding the use of sulfonyl chlorides in corrosion
inhibiting agents not obvious from prior use as intermediates in the production of sulfonic
acid). Cf In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (involving a prior art compound
having useful properties but also undesirable side-effects). Note that in In Re Albrecht, the
ruling is questionable because one could have been motivated by the prior art compound to
prepare an analog retaining the useful properties, but lacking the undesirable side-effects.
70. Although the existing case law discusses only the utility or properties of prior art
compounds as motivation to make the new compounds, one can imagine other "motivating"
facts.
71. In re Gyurik, 596 F.2d 1012, 1018 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
72. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc), reh 'g ofln re Dillon, 892 F.2d
1554 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
73. See supra Part II.B.l.b.
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properties of the claimed compound made to rebut a finding of prima
facie obviousness. 74 The previously disclosed properties of a prior art
compound can provide sufficient motivation to trigger a prima facie
obviousness objection, even though the new compound has unrelated,
different, and unexpected properties. It is then the applicant's re-
sponsibility to rebut the presumption by showing that his compound
has unexpected properties relative to prior art compounds. 75
The Dillon court said:
[S]tructural similarity between claimed and prior art subject mat-
ter, proved by combining references or otherwise, where the prior
art gives reason or motivation to make the claimed compositions,
creates a prima facie case of obviousness .... [T]he burden (and
opportunity) then falls on an applicant to rebut that prima facie
case .... [I]t is not necessary in order to establish a prima facie
case of obviousness that both a structural similarity between a
claimed and prior art compound (or a key component of a compo-
sition) be shown and that there be a suggestion in or expectation
from the prior art that the claimed compound or composition will
have the same or a similar utility as one newly discovered by ap-
plicant.
Properties... are relevant to the creation of a primafacie case in
the sense of affecting the motivation of a researcher to make com-
pounds closely related to or suggested by a prior art compound,
but it is not required, as stated in the dissent, that the prior art dis-
close or suggest the properties newly-discovered by an applicant in
order for there to be aprimafacie case of obviousness. 76
When the claimed compound is included in a large genus previ-
ously disclosed in the prior art, questions might arise as to its patent-
ability. Previously treated mostly as an anticipation matter, 77 this is-
sue is now more often raised during obviousness analysis. The
Federal Circuit now considers that such compounds are not only
74. See infra Part II.B.2.
75. See infra Part II.B.2.
76. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692-97.
77. Disclosure of a chemical genus is generally not an adequate disclosure of the indi-
vidual compounds for the purposes of anticipation. In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586 (C.C.P.A.
1972); In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1965). Anticipation requires either that the
compound be individually disclosed in the prior art or that it be disclosed as a member of a
"small recognizable class [of compounds] with common properties." In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d
965, 974 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (requiring that a compound be individually disclosed in prior art, or
part of a small recognizable class of compounds).
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novel but also nonobvious unless something in the prior art motivates
the skilled person to select the claimed compound among the multi-
tude included in the genus.78 This motivation goes somewhat beyond
the mere prior art disclosure of a structural analog and its properties
as required in the Heinz-Henze and Stemninsky-Dillon lines of cases.
Similar to what has been said above about insufficient structural
similarity, even though the rebuttal of a prima facie obviousness de-
termination usually involves a showing of unexpected properties, 79 it
can also be done by showing that the prior art is so deficient that it
does not provide a motivation to make the new compound.
For the purposes of this discussion, the notion of suggestion or
motivation is used in the narrow sense of "suggestion or motivation
to make a specific molecular modification" or "chemical suggestion"
because this is the terminology found in the In re Stemninsky line of
cases. The broader "suggestion test" for obviousness as understood
in the mechanical art would include both structural analogy and sug-
gestion in the narrow sense (prior art property). In other words, for
the prior art to provide complete suggestion or motivation leading to
prima facie obviousness the motivation originating from a prior art
analog chemical structure acting as template (Hass-Henze) must be
supplemented by the knowledge that the latter has some utility or
property (Stemninsky-Dillon).
c. Enabling Disclosure and Reasonable Expectation
of Success
Before a prima facie case of obviousness can be made, the prior
art must also show how to practice the invention -disclose or ren-
der obvious a process indicating how to make or obtain the claimed
compound -in addition to sufficiently similar compounds and sug-
gestion or motivation (narrow sense). The issue is often not even
mentioned in traditional chemical cases because most molecular
modifications are easily performed according to standard organic
chemistry reactions. Nevertheless, in a few relevant cases the prior
art did not disclose or render obvious a method able to make 'the oth-
erwise obvious compound. The courts decided that the lack of an
78. See, e.g., In re Baird 16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, (Fed.
Cir. 1992). Note also the similarity to In re O'Farrell, holding that improper "obvious to try"
rejections include inventions where one must "vary all parameters or try each of numerous
possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either
no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible
choices is likely to be successful." In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
79. See infra Part II.B.2.
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enabling disclosure in the prior art rendered the compounds them-
selves nonobvious and patentable. 80
In In re Hoeksema,81 the applicant claimed a furanoside similar
to others disclosed in the prior art. He argued that since no prior art
process was able to yield his compound the latter was patentable
notwithstanding structural similarities or unexpected properties:
Despite this close structural similarity between the De Boer
amino compound [prior art] and the alkylamino and dialkylamino
compounds included in the appealed claim, appellant chose not to
submit a showing of unexpected properties in his claimed com-
pounds. Appellant asserted that his compounds were unobvious
and patentable without such a showing. He urged that De Boer
does not teach one of ordinary skill in the art how to make appel-
lant's claimed compounds, and the examiner did not cite any other
reference telling how they might be made.82
The court agreed with the appellant:
In the context of section 103, we are not permitted to
fragment a claimed invention in applying that section. The
clear mandate of the statute which governs our analysis re-
quires that we consider the invention as a whole in making
the determination.
Thus, as we apply the statute to the present invention,
we must ask first, what is the invention as a whole? Nec-
essarily, by elementary patent law principles, it is the
claimed compound, but, so considered, unless there is
some known or obvious way to make the compound, the
invention is nothing more than a mental concept expressed
in chemical terms and formulae on a paper.
We are certain, however, that the invention as a
whole is the claimed compound and a way to produce it,
wherefore appellant's argument has substance.83
The court properly summarized the issue as follows:
If the prior art of record fails to disclose or render obvious
a method for making a claimed compound, at the time the
invention was made, it may not be legally concluded that
80. See In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Brown, 329 F.2d 1006
(C.C.P.A. 1964); see also In re Dow Chemical Co., 837 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Cf In re
Payne, 606 F.2d 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (enabling disclosure found).
81. In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
82. Id. at 271 (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
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the compound itself is in the possession of the public. In
this context, we say that the absence of a known or obvi-
ous process for making the claimed compounds overcomes
a presumption that the compounds are obvious, based on
close relationships between their structures and those of
prior art compounds.84
Thus, in addition to the arguments discussed here, 5 prima facie
obviousness can be rebutted by showing that the prior art does not
provide an enabling disclosure, i.e., a method which enables one to
practice the invention with a reasonable expectation of success. This
explains why the inquiry into obviousness of products proposed as
patentable inventions must sometimes focus on the method used to
make or obtain them.86
As noted above, the importance of an enabling disclosure in the
context of product obviousness is diminished in the field of tradi-
tional chemistry, where a compound first formulated on paper is gen-
erally easy to make by following standard synthesis methods. How-
ever, it becomes most important in biotechnology products which are
often obtained after complicated and initially unreliable processes.
As a result, in many biotechnology cases, the "reasonable expectation
of success" of the method used to obtain the product has become the
measure of obviousness for the product itself. Such products are
usually widely suggested in the prior art and made precisely to have
specific, expected properties. Accordingly, biotechnology products
are ill-suited for the rebuttal arguments of lack of suggestion or un-
expected properties which are usually invoked against prima facie
obviousness in traditional chemical cases. In addition, first genera-
tion biotechnology products are generally naturally-occurring prod-
ucts. In such cases, the contribution of the inventor typically resides
in the discovery itself rather than in the design of a new structure -
either by molecular modification or de novo. In situations where the
prior art provides a general method for systematically making dis-
coveries, like in biotechnology, some inquiry into the discovery proc-
ess is appropriate when examining obviousness issues.
84. Id. at 274 (footnote omitted). Further case law discusses how reliable the method
should be to constitute an enabling disclosure. According to the law of enablement (35 U.S.C.
§ 112), an "enabling" method should not require undue experimentation from the skilled per-
son to practice the invention. In other words, it must provide a reasonable expectation of suc-
cess to obtain the invention. In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
85. See discussion supra Parts II.B.l.a, II.B.l.b; see also discussion infra Part II.B.2.
86. The Federal Circuit has difficulty accepting this notion. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d
1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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For all these reasons, "reasonable expectation of success" issues
arise mostly in biotechnology cases and have until recently provided
the main rebuttal argument against prima facie obviousness findings
in biotechnology products.87
2. Rebuttal of the Presumption (Unexpected Properties)
An applicant may rebut the presumption of obviousness in sev-
eral ways. As noted above, the applicant may show that the new
compound is not close enough structurally to known compounds,88
that the prior art does not provide suggestion or motivation to make
it,89 or a reliable method to obtain it.90 In addition, the applicant may
rebut the presumption of obviousness by proving that the compound
has unexpected properties.
This rule was initially set out in In re Papesch, where the appli-
cant had claimed a pyrazole compound, whose lower homologue was
disclosed in a prior art reference. 91 Faced with a PTO Board rejection
for structural obviousness, he unsuccessfully argued that his com-
pound had anti-inflammatory properties not present in the prior art
analog compounds. On appeal, the CCPA accepted the argument and
overturned the PTO decision holding that "[f]rom the standpoint of
patent law, a compound and all of its properties are inseparable." 92
The court affirmed that beyond a compound's structure, contempla-
tion of its properties is required for an ultimate obviousness determi-
nation. Accordingly, the court deemed the anti-inflammatory com-
pounds nonobvious and patentable. In this case, the applicant had
rebutted a presumption of obviousness based on structural similarity
by showing that his claimed compounds had unexpected properties
(anti-inflammatory properties) not present in prior art analogs. Al-
though the court in Papesch did not use the terminology, the appli-
cant had essentially rebutted a prima facie case of obviousness.
In Papesch, the unexpected anti-inflammatory property was pre-
sent only in the claimed compounds and not in the prior art structural
analogs. However, more often than not, newly created compounds
differ from prior art either by exhibiting the same property but to a
87. See, e.g., Amgen Inc., v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1208
(Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d
894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Exparte Erlich, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1011 (1986).
88. See discussion supra Part II.B.I.a.
89. See discussion supra Part II.B.l.b.
90. See discussion supra Part II.B.l.c.
91. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381,382 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
92. Id. at 391.
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different degree or by exhibiting a new property alongside other
common properties. Except in short dicta, none of these issues are
directly-addressed in Papesch.
a. Difference in Degree of a Same Property
After Papesch, the courts had to determine whether a difference
in degree of a same property would amount to an "unexpected prop-
erty" sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness. In dictum,
the Papesch court hinted at a negative answer by noting "[a] mere
difference in degree is not the marked superiority which ordinarily
will remove the unpatentability of adjacent homologues of old sub-
stances." 93
However, the case law gradually began to consider a significant
difference in degree of a same property as equivalent to an unex-
pected property. In In re Lohr,94 the court said that to be so "clear
and convincing evidence of substantially greater effectiveness is
needed." This principle was reaffirmed in numerous cases and more
recently in In re Chupp,95 which involved a herbicide which was
demonstrated to be superior to prior art herbicides in combating
weeds in some - but not all - crops. The court decided that a supe-
rior herbicidal activity constituted an unexpected property for the
purpose of rebutting a case of prima facie obviousness: 96 The court
noted that "evidence of unobvious or unexpected advantageous prop-
erties ... may include data showing that a compound is unexpectedly
superior in a property it shares with prior art compounds.". 97
Whereas the principle of accepting a difference in degree of a
same property as rebuttal of prima facie obviousness is now well set-
tled, much less is known regarding what quantitative superiority in
properties is required to be considered unexpected. In In re Merck,98
the applicant claimed a method of treating depression in humans by
amitriptyline, a compound having stronger sedative and anticholiner-
gic effects than prior art analogs. Rejecting the claims, the court im-
plied that a quantitative assessment of the differences between prior
art compounds and those used in the claimed method would be rele-
93. Id. at 392.
94. 317 F.2d 388, 392 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (insecticidal thiophosphate).
95. 816 F.2d 643,646 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 647. See also In re Lunsford, 357 F.2d 380, 385 (C.C.P.A. 1966); In re Wag-
ner, 371 F.2d 877, 885 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
97. In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
98. In re Merck, 800 F.2d 1091, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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vant to the nonobviousness determination: "In the absence of evi-
dence to show that the properties of the compounds differed in such
an appreciable degree that the difference was really unexpected, we
do not think that the Board erred in its determination that appellant's
evidence was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case."99
In United States v. Ciba-Geigy,100 the court admitted that a thi-
azide anti-hypertensive compound ten times more potent than those
in the prior art was nonobvious and patentable. In In re Lunsford,1°'
an increase in anti-convulsant potency of 4.4 to 7.0 times was
deemed sufficient to patent the claimed compound. Conversely, in
Exparte Thim, 02 a proinsulin analog leading to an expression yield
1.6 to 2.0 times greater than prior art proinsulins was found obvious
because the yield increase was "not so significantly superior that it
overcomes the prima facie case of obviousness."'' 03
b. Common Properties in Addition to a New Property
In another dictum, the Papesch court implied that common
properties shared by prior art and claimed compounds would not pre-
clude patentability conferred by a new, unexpected property:
The argument has been made that patentability is here being as-
serted only on the basis of one property, the anti-inflammatory ac-
tivity, and that the compounds claimed and the compound of the
prior art presumably have many properties in common. Presuma-
bly they do, but presumption is all we have here. 1' 4
However, according to subsequent cases in which the issue was
directly raised, the existence of significant common properties in ad-
dition to new and unexpected ones seems to be viewed as relevant to
patentability. °5 In In re De Montmollin,16 the applicant had claimed
a dyestuff effective on both cotton and wool, whereas the prior art
structural analog was effective on wool only. 07 The court decided
99. Id. at 1099 (emphasis added).
100. United States v. Ciba-Geigy, Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1157, 1172 (D.N.J. 1979)
(hydrochlorothiazide).
101. In re Lunsford, 357 F.2d 380, 385 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
102. 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 941 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991).
103. Id. at 1944. See also discussion infra Part III.B.
104. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
105. In re De Montmollin, 344 F.2d 976, 978-89 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Mod, 408 F.2d
1055, 1057 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1385, 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re May,
574 F.2d 1082, 1092 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
106. 344 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
107. Id. at 977.
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that structural similarity plus significant common properties rendered
the claimed compound obvious. The court noted, "we do not regard
the additional ability to dye cotton sufficient to render the subject
matter as a whole unobvious. We think the reference teachings pro-
vide more than adequate reason to those of ordinary skill for making
the present compounds." 108
The last sentence shows how the court seems to confuse two
distinct steps in which properties of prior art compounds are relevant
to obviousness. On the one hand, properties are relevant for estab-
lishing the motivation necessary for a finding of prima facie obvious-
ness.109 On the other hand, according to the present line of cases,
properties are relevant to an ultimate obviousness determination
when common and new properties are compared. Although both is-
sues should be distinguished, the confusion is present in most cases
prior to In re Dillon.
In another similar case, In re May,"0 the court suggested that
common and new properties be "balanced" against each others:
We are of the opinion that a novel chemical compound can be
nonobvious to one having ordinary skill in the art notwithstanding
that it may possess a known property in common with a known
structurally similar compound. Thus, merely because those skilled
in the art would have expected the compound of claim 11 to have
analgesic activity, does not mean, as the board apparently sug-
gests, that an irrebuttable presumption of obviousness has been
established. Those properties which would have been expected
must be balanced against the unexpected properties.' 1
"Balancing" common and new properties, as suggested by this
line of cases, is neither easy nor objective. The rule probably arises
from the concern that owners of patented prior art analog compounds
would be hurt if a new analog compound sharing significant common
properties with their products, with only marginal additional proper-
ties, were allowed to enter the market without risking any infringe-
ment liability." 2 The "balancing" doctrine will certainly have to be
108. lId at 979.
109. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.b.
110. 574 F.2d 1082 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
111. Id. at 1093-94 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (quoting In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389, 1395-6
(C.C.P.A. 1975)).
112. The only recourse for the patent owner would be either a suit for literal infringement
since his compound was probably used as a starting material for making the new one (facing a
defense of experimental exemption) or an uncertain suit for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.
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revived in biotechnology, with the advent of second-generation pro-
teins bearing both common and new properties when compared with
first-generation proteins.
II. RECOMBINANT INVENTIONS TYPOLOGY
The case law and the criteria for the obviousness determination
just described were all developed with traditional chemistry and its
principal path to new compounds -molecular modification -in
mind. Accordingly, structural similarity with prior art compounds
plays a central role in determining obviousness, nuanced by
"redeeming" circumstances such as lack of a prior art property
(Stemninsky-Dillon), lack of an enabling method (Hoeksema), and
unexpected properties (Papesch). However, the range of recombi-
nant inventions amenable to patenting is very diverse, both as to their
conception and their differences from the prior art. Accordingly, the
obviousness inquiry of § 103 will focus on different subtests, de-
pending on the nature of the subject matter. Although all DNAs and
proteins can be considered "chemical compounds,"" 3 the subtests
which are used in traditional chemistry as described above are not
applicable in all cases. Notably, the significance of structural simi-
larity between prior art and claimed compounds, so important in tra-
ditional chemistry, makes little sense in relation to recombinant
products obtained by means other than molecular modification of
prior art compounds. In such cases, a court should return to the
original meaning of § 103 on nonobviousness, rather than use rigid
subtests which were devised in a different context.
Along these lines, this article will distinguish three categories of
recombinant products:
1. "translation" inventions, such as naturally-occurring DNAs.
A typical example is the retrieval of the gene encoding for erythro-
poietin (EPO), based on a method starting from the partial amino acid
sequence of the protein. The contribution of the inventor resides in
her use of a technique to transform basic information (amino acid se-
quence plus DNA library or database) from the prior art into another
form (DNA sequence). Because this approach allows one to system-
atically make useful discoveries for the first time in history, none of
113. To a certain extent, every tangible matter could be considered a "chemical com-
pound." The fact that originally only small molecules (and now macromolecules as well)
could be defined by their exact chemical formula should not radically change the patent law
analysis because it only reflects how subject matter is characterized, rather than the subject
matter itself.
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the obviousness analysis developed in the chemical or mechanical
arts applies. Under current law, and despite the efforts of the Federal
Circuit, "translation" inventions are at great risk of being found obvi-
ous, as soon as the underlying technology is mature.
2. "molecular modification" inventions, such as second-
generation proteins or DNAs obtained by incremental modifications
of their sequence. A typical example would be a natural peptidic
hormone, modified to have a longer half-life or stronger potency. The
inventive step resides in the creation de novo of at least some part of
the sequence, starting from a prior art sequence as template and sub-
stituting, adding, or subtracting elements (amino acids or nucleotides)
having no autonomous functional meaning. Due to similarities in the
mode of conception, the obviousness analysis developed in the tradi-
tional chemical case law applies without major obstacles to such re-
combinant "molecular modification" inventions.
3. "combination" inventions, such as DNA vectors or second-
generation proteins designed by combining prior art functional do-
mains. Typical examples include vectors having promoters compati-
ble with two or more different expression systems or a hybrid protein
featuring a functional domain having a specific pharmacological ac-
tivity and another functional domain allowing a better penetration
into the target cell. In such inventions, the contribution of the in-
ventor resides in the very combination of prior art functional units
(sequences). Due to similarities in the mode of conception, the obvi-
ousness analysis developed in mechanical inventions which combine
prior art functional elements also applies without major problems to
recombinant "combination" inventions.
This article will now discuss the three categories while inte-
grating the relevant case law.
A. "Translation" Inventions: Naturally-Occurring DNAs
The first category of recombinant inventions concerns naturally
occurring DNAs, retrieved by starting from the corresponding protein
sequence.1 4 In such inventions, the contribution of the inventor re-
sides in the discovery of a naturally-occurring structure" 5 rather than
114. Or from a partial amino acid sequence long enough to allow the unambiguous local-
ization of the DNA in the library. The minimal size for DNA probes is typically 15 to 25 resi-
dues (15 to 25-mers oligonucleotides), depending on the size of the library screened.
115. Strictly speaking, not all DNAs encoding for natural proteins do "occur in nature,"
due to the presence of introns in the genome of eukaryotic organisms. However, most occur in
nature in the form of mRNAs, easily converted in cDNA.
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in the creation of a new structure or of part of it. Instead of making
incremental modifications to prior art molecules, as in traditional
chemistry, the developer of a "translation" DNA starts from the mo-
lecular information contained in a prior art protein in order to retrieve
the corresponding DNA from a suitable DNA library. Since both the
starting material (the prior art protein) and the resulting product (the
retrieved DNA) have a similar informational content, encoded in dif-
ferent molecules (or alphabet), these DNAs will be called
"translation" inventions 1 6 Due to the different mode of conception
of "translation" inventions, the case law on chemical and mechanical
inventions provides little guidance in deciding obviousness. Since
they do not exist in usable form in nature, retrieved "translation"
DNAs are patentable subject matter under § 101. Since they were
previously undiscovered, they will also generally be new, as required
by § 102. However, questions arise as to their obviousness under §
103, because, in order to retrieve the DNA, prior art protein informa-
tion is used to screen a prior art DNA library or database'17 according
to a prior art method." 8 It does not make sense to apply the obvious-
ness analysis relative to the criteria of structural similarity to
"translation" DNAs.
In traditional chemistry, the presence of a prior art structural
analog is relevant to obviousness because, along with a known prop-
erty, it provides suggestion and motivation to the skilled person to
make a new compound by modifying the prior art analog. The ra-
tionale underlying this analysis is that similar compounds generally
have similar properties. Since the molecular modification approach
has long been the only one (aside from mere serendipity) able to
yield new and useful compounds, courts and practitioners have
learned to look systematically for structural analogs when determin-
116. Due to the degeneracy of the genetic code, a protein actually contains slightly less
information than its corresponding natural DNA and is by itself not sufficient to retrieve it.
The resulting information gap is filled by the information contained in the DNA library.
Transposed in the linguistic translation metaphor, the degeneracy of the genetic code is equal
to the translation of the same notion expressed by a single word in the starting language, and
by several alternate words in the receiving language. The basis of the DNA library is a univer-
sal language.
117. As already noted, the painstaking process of hybridizing probes in actual DNA li-
braries will soon be replaced by a computer search.
118. To continue with the linguistic metaphor, whereas a mere translation would reach the
level of innovation required for a copyright (originality), it would not reach a level equivalent
to nonobviousness in patent law (e.g., to win an originality prize). The level of innovation
required by originality in copyright law is generally less demanding than that required by non-
obviousness in patent law.
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ing chemical obviousness. With time, people forgot the original
meaning of the reasoning and started to equate the presence of prior
art structural analogs with prima facie obviousness. However, struc-
tural similarity is relevant to obviousness almost exclusively in the
context of a molecular modification approach involving incremental
modification of prior art structures. Section 103 does not require that
the prior art disclose a structural analog in all cases. Rather, it re-
quires that the prior art as a whole provide the skilled person with a
motivation or suggestion to make the new invention. It follows that
suggestion or motivation can be provided by means other than struc-
tural analogs, especially when methods other than molecular modifi-
cation are used. In other words, structural analogs are not required
for a finding of prima facie obviousness, even though they constitute
a reliable sign when the molecular modification approach is used.119
However, in the context of "translation" DNAs, the suggestion
or motivation to make the invention is immediately and automatically
provided by the general knowledge that producing a protein by in-
serting the corresponding DNA into a recombinant organism is ad-
vantageous. The suggestion arises as soon as a new natural protein is
isolated and characterized. As a result, the "suggestion test" (broader
sense) is automatically met in virtually all cases of translation DNAs.
We saw previously that when the prior art provides the motiva-
tion or suggestion for making an invention, the invention may be
nonobvious - hence patentable - if no enabling method is avail-
able at the time the invention is made.120 The measure of an enabling
method is that it must allow the inventor to make his product with a
reasonable expectation of success.12' In the context of translation
DNAs, the enabling method consists of building degenerate DNA
probes from the prior art amino acid sequence and hybridizing them
in a suitable DNA library to retrieve the desired full-length DNA.'2
119. In the case of translation DNAs, the role played by structural similarity in traditional
chemistry is played by the informational similarity between the prior art protein and the DNA.
From structural obviousness, we shift to informational obviousness.
120. See discussion supra Part II.B.l.c. In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269 (C.C.P.A. 1968);
In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
121. See In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 472 (Fed. Cir. 1988); See also In re
O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
122. This assumes that the prior art protein has already been isolated and purified to an
extent allowing at least partial sequencing. I do not include the isola-
tion/purification/sequencing of the protein in the "translation" method. This step sometimes
constitutes the nonobvious step on the road to the corresponding DNA. See, e.g., Ex parte
Maize], 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. BNA) 1662 (1992) (prior art protein mostly char-
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Among the criteria used in traditional chemistry cases, the criteria re-
garding the enabling method makes the most sense in the context of
translation inventions. Obviously, the answer to the question of
whether the translation method has a reasonable expectation of suc-
cess will strongly depend on the development stage of the technol-
ogy.
Finally, the notion of unexpected properties used in traditional
chemistry to rebut prima facie obviousness'23 does not add to the
analysis in the context of translation DNAs. The properties of DNA,
both direct (encoding the desired protein) and indirect (that of the en-
coded protein), 24 are known in advance and hence expected.
Accordingly, with one exception, 2 5 case law concerning the ob-
viousness of translation DNAs focuses on whether the method used
to obtain the DNA has a reasonable expectation of success.126 If there
is no reasonable expectation of success, the DNA is nonobvious, and
patentable.127 If there is a reasonable expectation of success, the
DNA is obvious and unpatentable. The situation is summarized in
Table 2.
acterized by its function did not preclude the patentability of the corresponding DNA because
it had not been isolated to sufficient purity allowing sequencing. The application was rejected
on other grounds).
123. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
124. For the purpose of evaluating unexpected properties of DNAs, both their direct prop-
erties and those of the corresponding protein are relevant. See Ex parte Anderson, 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1866, 1869 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993) ("In the case before us, appellants
are claiming a DNA and the use of that DNA. What is of concern in the consideration of re-
buttal evidence are the properties of the DNA itself and/or the product it produces, i.e., the
protein it codes for.").
125. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
126. See cases cited in Part III.A.I.
127. This implies that the applicant has brought some nonobvious improvement to the
prior art method to render it "enabling."
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TYPE OF STATUTORY INVENTION IS FACTOR USUALLY
INVENTION DISPOSITION "OBVIOUS TO A REDEEMING
APPLICABLE SKILLED PERSON" PATENTABILITY
IF PRIORART
PROVIDES
Translation inven- 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): "basic informa- no reasonable ex-
tions "A patent may not tion" underlying pectation of sue-
(DNAs obtained be obtained... if invention (protein cess of the method
from the corre- the... subject sequence) of "translation"
sponding protein) matter... would +
have been obvious method of
to a person having "translation"
ordinary skill in the
art..."
Table 2. Obviousness of "translation" inventions. 128
This article will next describe the approach to "translation" in-
ventions before and after In re Deuel,129 which represents a clear de-
parture from the logic of earlier cases.
1. Before In re Deuel
The decisions by the Federal Circuit and the PTO Board of Pat-
ent Appeals and Interferences appear to be split in their ultimate as-
sessment of the obviousness of translation inventions. Two Federal
Circuit cases, Amgen v. Chugai,130 and In re Bell,131 where the inven-
tions were found patentable, held the prior art "translation" method
as arcane and not enabling (not apt to yield the claimed DNAs with a
reasonable expectation of success). The decisions singled out non-
obvious improvements of the method by the applicant and or his de-
parture from prior art teachings. Other decisions by both the Federal
Circuit and the PTO Board acknowledge the increasingly routine
character of the translation process, and deem obvious the claimed
DNAs. 132 Importantly, whatever the ultimate decision on obvious-
128. Although the Federal Circuit considers that the notion of "prima facie" obviousness
applies to any invention (In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)), the issue is mentioned
almost exclusively with molecular modification inventions.
129. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
130. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
131. 991 F.2d781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
132. Exparte Hudson, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1322, 1325 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990); Ex
parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445, 1449 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993); Exparte Movva,
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ness, all cases properly focus on the method of "translation" in their
inquiry.
In Amgen v. Chugai,133 the plaintiff sued for infringement of a
patent covering the natural DNA sequence encoding for human
erythropoietin (EPO). The defendant asserted, among other defenses,
that Amgen's patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Although
the Federal Circuit found that it was "obvious to try" to obtain the
DNA sequence of erythropoietin following probing methods avail-
able at the time, it also considered that the latter did not enable the
inventor to do so with a "reasonable expectation of success.' ' 34 In
other words, the applicant had used a nonobvious improvement to the
prior art method to find the DNA sequence. The only improvement
the court could find was that Amgen's inventor had used a known
method under more painstaking conditions than been previously
donel 35. To retrieve the DNA coding for erythropoietin, the inventor
had used two fully degenerated sets of DNA probes to screen a
genomic DNA library, whereas the same had only been done before
with cDNA libraries, which are easier to screen due to a smaller size.
The court stated:
The district court specifically found that, as of 1983, none of the
prior art references "suggest[s] that the probing strategy of using
two fully-redundant [sic] sets of probes, of relatively high degen-
eracy [sic], to screen a human genomic library would be likely to
succeed in pulling out the gene of interest." While it found that
defendants had shown that these procedures were "obvious to try,"
the references did not show that there was a reasonable expectation
of success.
We agree with the district court's conclusion, which was supported
by adequate testimony.136
As a result, the DNA was found nonobvious and the patent
valid. The extreme care the Federal Circuit took to demonstrate that
the prior art probing method was indeed not enabling in order to ul-
timately admit the validity of Amgen's patent illustrates the growing
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. BNA) 1027, 1033 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993); In re Sun,
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
133. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
134. The court found not enabling both a first approach using two sets of fully degenerate
synthetic probes deduced from the partial human erythropoietin amino acid sequence, and a
second approach using as probe a baboon gene with known homology to the human gene Id.
at 1208.
135. 927 F.2d 1200 at 1207-1208 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
136. Id. (citations omitted).
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tension between the statutory requirement for nonobviousness, which
appears especially challenging for biotechnology inventions, and the
policy concern that patent protection is necessary for biotechnology
products that may potentially be developed into drugs.
Two years later, In re Bell1 37 addressed a patent application di-
rected to DNAs encoding human insulin-like growth factors (IGF).
The application was first rejected by the PTO Board on grounds of
obviousness over the prior art disclosure of IGF's amino acid se-
quences and prior art probing methods. The Federal Circuit reversed,
first noting that due to the degeneracy of the genetic code, the amino
acid sequence of IGF by itself could not render the gene obvious. It
also found that the prior art retrieval method which was used could
not fill the gap 38 because it taught away from the method used by the
applicant. 39
By focusing specifically on a particular method,1 40 which argua-
bly taught away from the invention, the Federal Circuit avoided a
discussion of the more general prior art probing method the appli-
cants had actually used. Had it done so, it would probably have had
to find obviousness since the general method was actually enabling,
i.e., able to retrieve the DNA with a reasonable expectation of suc-
cess. The court likely believed that the patentability argument that
DNA retrieval methods were not "enabling" was growing weaker as
the technique improved. Distancing itself from that type of argu-
ment, the court insisted at the very end of its decision that the focus
on the retrieval method was misplaced because the applicant had
claimed a product, not a method.141 Most of the court's analysis nev-
ertheless focused on the retrieval method. 142 It is not surprising,
given the various traditional criteria able to rebut an obviousness
finding (lack of suggestion, lack of enabling method, unexpected
properties), that the lack of an enabling method is the only one which
makes sense in the context of translation DNAs.
Other decisions, by both the Federal Circuit and the PTO Board,
use the same focus on the method but decide for obviousness. In Ex
parte Hudson, 43 the PTO Board had to decide the patentability of a
137. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
138. This gap was referred to above as the "information gap" when one goes from protein
to DNA.
139. Sherman M. Weissman, Method for Cloning Genes, U.S. Pat. No. 4,394,443.
140. The method was first described by Weissman, who patented it. See id.
141. Bell, 991 F.2d at 785.
142. Id.
143. 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1322 (Bd. Pat. App & Int. 1990).
38 COMPUTER &IHGHTECI1NOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 13
gene encoding a porcine protein (preprorelaxine). The partial amino
acid sequence of preprorelaxine was previously known, and its exis-
tence as a subunit structure suggested. The Board essentially held
that both suggestion in the prior art and a reasonable expectation of
success (enabling method) were present, rendering the gene unpat-
entable based on obviousness:
[O]nce the amino acid sequence of a known useful protein is
known, there is motivation for one of ordinary skill in the relevant
art to construct a synthetic gene for biosynthesis of that protein.
Whether or not the specific biosynthesis involved would have been
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 depends on the specific facts in
each case, but the critical inquiry is would there have been a rea-
sonable expectation of success in achieving the desired goal, ap-
plying only the knowledge evidenced as being part of the prior art.
The weight of the evidence of record here is that there would have
been such a reasonable expectation of success 144.
In Ex parte Deuel,145 the PTO Board reached essentially the
same conclusion, deciding that the DNA sequence encoding for hu-
man heparin-binding growth factor (IHBGF) was prima facie obvious
from its partial amino acid sequence. It identified the issue at stake
as "whether or not knowledge of the partial amino acid sequence of a
protein, in conjunction with a reference indicating a general method
of cloning, renders the invention as a whole, i.e., the gene, prima fa-
cie obvious.' 146
The court then went on to consider whether the prior art knowl-
edge of both the N-terminal amino acid sequence of a protein of in-
terest and a method of probing which allowed the isolation of the
DNA corresponding to a protein whose N-terminal amino acid se-
quence is known, would render the retrieval of the DNA feasible with
a reasonable expectation of success.147 Accordingly, it rejected all
claims on obviousness grounds.148 The PTO Board decision was sub-
sequently overturned by the Federal Circuit. 149
In Ex parte Movva, 50 the PTO Board repeated what it had said
in Ex parte Hudson and Ex parte Deuel even though its decision
144. Id. at 1324 (citation omitted).
145. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993).
146. Id. at 1447.
147. Id. at 1448-49.
148. Id. at 1450.
149. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See infra Part III.A.2.
150. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993).
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came shortly after the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Bell. It
deemed the gene coding for swine growth hormone (sGH) obvious
from the partial amino acid sequence of sGH, despite the degeneracy
of the genetic code. The PTO Board considered that the prior art
general method of DNA probing (Suggs) rendered the retrieval of the
complete genetic sequence feasible with a reasonable expectation of
success. Unlike the court in Bell, the PTO Board focused on the gen-
eral probing method and not on a specific method which could "teach
away" from it.
A few months after Bell, the Federal Circuit decided a similar
issue in In re Sun. 5' The PTO Board had rejected an application for
a DNA encoding of a plant protein on the basis that two abstracts
published more than a year before by the applicants, describing the
protein by its properties and physicochemical features, anticipated it
and thus rendered it obvious. 52 The applicants having omitted to
dispute an inherency finding by the PTO Board, appealed to the Fed-
eral Circuit, which examined the case primarily as an anticipation
case. 53 Accordingly, its inquiry focused on whether the references
cited as anticipating were enabling. 54 The holding is nevertheless
relevant, a fortiori, to obviousness analysis. Although neither of the
allegedly anticipating abstracts is directly quoted, nor their exact ref-
erences given, the text of the decision implies that they only give ba-
sic information on the protein:
Although the examiner admitted that the abstracts lacked the
"teaching of specific amino acid sequences encoded by the DNA
sequences,".., he nevertheless found that all limitations of the
claims were inherent in these publications. Appellants did not dis-
pute inherency.
In the final office action, the examiner took official notice of the
availability to one skilled in the art of "protein purification and se-
quencing techniques, molecular weight determination techniques,
sedimentation rate determination techniques, oligonucleotide syn-
thesis techniques, DNA isolation techniques, mRNA isolation
techniques, cDNA synthesis techniques, and hybridization tech-
niques."[ 155] The examiner further noted that "[n]o evidence of the
151. In re Sun, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
152. Id. at 1453
153. Id. at 1455.
154. Id.
155. Interestingly, the PTO Board took the exact opposite position in Ex parte Maizel,
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recalcitrance of the... [specific] ... protein to conventional
protein purification or sequencing procedures was presented," nor
evidence "regarding the recalcitrance of the gene encoding the...
[specific]... protein to conventional probing or cloning tech-
niques."
It is undisputed that the publications disclosed the location and
characteristics of the relevant ... protein. The examiner then took
official notice that standard techniques were available for separat-
ing proteins, determining sedimentation rates and molecular
weight, and determining amino acid sequences. These would en-
able isolation of the subunit of the protein and determination of its
structure. The publications also disclosed that a ... DNA frag-
ment.., was used as a probe. The examiner asserted that with this
description of the probe, one of ordinary skill in the art could use
conventional techniques to make the probe, and therefore, to prac-
tice the claimed invention.156
Since all claims in the application were considered as antici-
pated, the court did not reach directly the issue of obviousness. Yet,
anticipation was based on the finding by the PTO Board that the
claims were inherent in the abstracts, which the applicants had not
appealed. Had they done so successfully, inherency appears dubious
at best. The court would have had to examine the case as an obvi-
ousness case. In that event, an obviousness finding would probably
have been reached, since all steps of the "translation," from the basic
information on the protein provided in the abstracts to the claimed
DNA, are clearly described by the court as being "available to one
skilled in the art."
The British Court of Appeals took a similar approach in re-
viewing Genentech's patent on the DNA encoding human tissue
which was decided about a year before In re Sun.
It is the examiner's position that BCGF is described as a protein useful in bol-
stering the immune response and the knowledge of the existence of the protein
would have motivated one of skill in the art to utilize recombinant DNA proto-
cols to (1) isolate the protein, (2) sequence the protein, (3) construct synthetic
probes from the proteins, (4) utilize the probes to isolate messenger RNA, (5)
synthetize a cDNA, and (6) produce additional protein. We reverse the rejec-
tion. The examiner's position reflects the "obviousness to try" approach of the
"armchair" chemist.
Exparte Maizel, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1668 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992). Unlike the
other cases cited, in both In re Sun and Ex parte Maizel, the "translation" method examined
includes the isolation/purification/sequencing of the protein. Maizel, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1668;
Sun, 31 U.S.P.Q. at 1453.
156. In re Sun, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (1993).
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plasminogen activator (t-PA).157 It found the DNA sequence obvious
over t-PA itself, which the prior art characterized by its properties
and various physicochemical features, but not by its amino acid se-
quence. t5 8 Although the British court expressed it in different words
than the U.S. courts, it made essentially the same analysis, inquiring
into whether the retrieval method used by Genentech's inventor had a
reasonable expectation of success: 59
Lord Diplock was indeed concerned with obviousness, as
Diplock L.J., in the case of Johns-Manville Corp's Pat-
ent .... []e expressed the view that the case that an allegedly
inventive idea was at the priority date "obvious and clearly did not
involve any inventive step" would have been made out if before
the priority date the man skilled in the art would have thought the
idea well worth trying out in order to see whether it would have
beneficial results. He took the view that it would be enough that
the person skilled in the art would assess the likelihood of success
as sufficient to warrant actual trial, without postulating prior cer-
tainty of success. In Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp v. Biorex
Laboratories Ltd, Graham J. formulated the question.., as being
whether a notional research group at the relevant date would have
been directly led to try a certain idea, in the expectation that it
might well produce a useful result. Again certainty of success was
not postulated.
By the various tests set out in the immediately foregoing para-
graph it was indeed obvious, in my judgment, to the person skilled
in the art to set out to produce human t-PA by recombinant DNA
technology.160
The split in these decisions on very similar matters is hardly ex-
plained by the maturation of the translation technology which would
have, from one day to the other, rendered obvious products which
were previously patentable. All patent applications described had
similar priority dates, which were in the early to mid 1980s. A better
explanation would be that the technology effectively matured during
157. Genentech Inc.'s Patent, [1989] R.P.C. 147 (C.A. 1988). The application also
claimed t-PA itself, as well as various methods relating to its manufacture. Id.
158. [1989] R.P.C. 147. Like in In re Sun and Exparte Maizel, the "translation" method
examined in Genetech Inc.'s Patent included the isolation/purification/sequencing of the pro-
tein or part of it (here t-PA). Id.
159. English patent law uses the terms "inventiveness" or "inventive step" rather than
"nonobviousness." Notwithstanding the variation of the terminology, the underlying notion is
similar.
160. Genentech Inc.'s Patent [1989] R.P.C. at 242 (emphasis added).
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this period, but this fact was not acknowledged simultaneously by the
various courts or authorities making the relevant decisions.
An alternative explanation of the split decisions is that the deci-
sions split according to their respective deciding authorities. Both
cases concluding nonobviousness and patentability were decided by
the Federal Circuit;161 whereas most cases concluding the opposite
originate from the PTO Board.162 Kenneth Burchfiel distinguishes a
"PTO analysis of biotechnology claims," differing from that of the
Federal Circuit.163 However, in all cases cited herein, the fundamen-
tal approach to obviousness analysis taken by both the Federal Cir-
cuit and the PTO is the same: focus on whether or not the method
used to obtain the DNA has a reasonable expectation of success. The
Federal Circuit is more inclined than the PTO to decide that there is
no reasonable expectation of success in using the method, which
probably reflects a more "pro-patent" attitude from the Federal Cir-
cuit as contrasted to that of the PTO.164 However, in an era where the
translation method at the heart of the inventions is practiced daily by
innumerable scientists worldwide, the Federal Circuit could not keep
rendering nonobviousness decisions by using the same obviousness
analysis. In addition, the advent of the Human Genome Project and
related extensive genomic databases will soon render this position
even less sustainable since the translation step, considered until now
as the main bottleneck in the process of retrieving genes, will become
considerably simpler.16s The tension between the statutory require-
ments for patentability and the policy concern that patent protection
i necessary had reached a breaking point.
161. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In
re Bell, 991 F.2d 78 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
162. Exparte Hudson, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1322 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990); Exparte
Movva, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Bd. Pat. App. & int. 1993); Ex parte Deuel, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993).
163. KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 86 (1995).
164. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, coinciding with a
radical change in U.S. government policy toward intellectual property rights. This ended dec-
ades of weak patent enforcement and strong antitrust policy. The new patent policy was nota-
bly implemented by the Stevenson-Wydler Act and the Bay-Dohl Act, both enacted in 1980.
Both acts encourage technology transfer from the public to the private sector. 15 U.S.C. §§
3701-3714 (1988); 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (1988).
165. Instead of having to screen innumerable clones for probe hybridization at the lab
bench (in the case of erythropoietin, Amgen had to probe 1,500,000 phage plaques of human
genomic library with its sets of degenerated probes), one will be able to "virtually" hybridize
"virtual" degenerate probes to "virtual" clones simply by comparing the DNA probe sequence
information deduced from the protein sequence to the sequence information stored in computer
databases.
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Faced with this dilemma and pressured by the biotechnology in-
dustry, 66 the Federal Circuit chose to maintain the patentability of
"translation" DNAs by overruling the PTO in In re Deuel167 To
reach its decision, the court radically changed its approach to the ob-
viousness analysis. This article will now briefly discuss the impor-
tant shortcomings of this decision. 168
2. In re Deuel
The court first decided that the approach it had taken in Amgen
v. Chugai and In re Bell, i.e., focusing on the reasonable expectation
of success of the retrieval method, was improper. It forcefully re-
peated the statement it had made in In re Bell without following it:
We today reaffirm the principle, stated in Bell, that the exis-
tence of a general method of isolating eDNA or DNA molecules is
essentially irrelevant to the question of whether the specific mole-
cules themselves would have been obvious, in the absence of other
prior art that suggests the claimed DNAs.169
In spite of its superficial appeal, this position overlooks an im-
portant aspect of translation DNAs: they are essentially naturally-
occurring products, in contrast to created or partly created structures.
Most of the contribution of the inventor resides in discovering the
translation DNA. Accordingly, the obviousness inquiry in such
products must necessarily focus on the retrieval method; adopting
another position amounts to deciding that they are by definition non-
obvious or that § 103 does not apply to them. 70 Most difficulties
arise because biotechnology is the first technology in history which
allows one to make discoveries in a reliable and systematic way once
some basic information is provided (e.g., an amino acid sequence).
Instead of acknowledging the specificity of the technology in-
volved, the court focused on a criterion familiar to old time chemists
whose main way to design new compounds was molecular modifica-
tion - structural similarity.
166. See the Amicus Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Association and the Bay Area
Bioscience Center urging the Federal Circuit to reverse the PTO's decision in Exparte Deuel.
167. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
168. See also Philippe Ducor, The Federal Circuit and In re Deuel: Does § 103 Apply to
Naturally Occurring DNA?, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 871 (1995).
169. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
170. Although the debate on the patentability of "products of nature" is now largely ob-
solete, doctrine and jurisprudence having decided long ago that they are patentable under some
conditions. It does not mean that these types of discoveries (as opposed to man-created struc-
tures) have no consequence in patent law.
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Because Deuel claims new chemical entities in structural terms, a
prima facie case of unpatentability requires that the teachings of
the prior art suggest the claimed compounds to a person of ordi-
nary skill in the art. Normally, a prima facie case of obviousness
is based upon structural similarity, i.e., an established structural
relationship between a prior art compound and the claimed com-
pound. Structural relationships may provide the requisite motiva-
tion or suggestion to modify known compounds to obtain new
compounds.1 71
Although the use of the conditional "may" opened up the possi-
bility that elements other than structural similarity might be relevant
to the obviousness determination, 72 the court acts as if this were not
the case:
Here, the prior art does not disclose any relevant cDNA mole-
cules, let alone close relatives of the specific, structurally-defined
cDNA molecules of claims 5 and 7 that might render them obvious
.... [W]hile the general idea of the claimed molecules, their func-
tion, and their general chemical nature may have been obvious
from [the prior art] teachings, and the knowledge that some gene
existed may have been clear, the precise cDNA molecules
[claimed] would not have been obvious over the [prior art], be-
cause [the prior art] teaches proteins, not the claimed or closely
related cDNA molecules. 73
Structural similarity makes little sense in the context of infor-
mational molecules such as DNAs, which are not designed by mo-
lecular modification. 74 An interesting implication of using this crite-
rion in the context of "translation" DNAs (or other naturally
171. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
172. Such as the informational similarity existing between a protein and its corresponding
DNA.
173. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
174. The attachment to the notion of structural similarity as the only element ever able to
render a compound obvious and the related implication that new compounds are still made by
molecular modification can also be found in Kenneth Burchfiel's book. Criticizing the posi-
tion of the PTO, he describes it as being "that enablement of an invention by prior art disclo-
sure of a similar method is sufficient to establish the obviousness of a biotechnology product
claim to the particular nucleic acid sequences obtained, without consideration of the relation-
ship of the prior art structures to the claimed structures, or the motivation provided by the
prior art to make the required modifications." BURcH-rEL, supra note 50 at 88 (emphasis
added).
Similarly, acknowledging the Federal Circuit's decision with satisfaction, Chester A. Bis-
bee writes "the message sent down from the CAFC is now clearly that biotechnology is to be
looked at as a subdivision of chemical patent practice." Chester A. Bisbee, Novel Gene Se-
quence Discovery Ruled Not Obvious, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, June 1, 1995, at 12.
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occurring products) is that it is virtually never met. This amounts to
a practical elimination of the requirement for nonobviousness for
these products, even when all the information necessary to discover
them is previously available.
On the same page that the court states that proteins could in no
way render obvious the corresponding DNA sequences, it directly
contradicts itself by acknowledging they indeed can, when encoded
by "unique" codons: 75 "A different result might pertain, however, if
there were prior art, e.g., a protein of sufficiently small size and sim-
plicity, so that lacking redundancy, each possible DNA would be ob-
vious over the protein."'176
By this statement, the court implicitly admits that the informa-
tional similarity of structurally different compounds -protein and
corresponding DNA- is as relevant to the obviousness determina-
tion as the structural similarity between other compounds. This is
because both actually suggest the new product to a person skilled in
the art.
In contrast, the court clearly rejects this notion when the prior
art protein is constituted from amino acids encoded by multiple
codons on the basis that contemplation or conception of the DNA is
impossible: 177
The redundancy of the genetic code precluded contemplation of or
focus on the specific cDNA molecules of claims 5 and 7. Thus,
one could not have conceived the subject matter of claims 5 and 7
based on the teachings in the cited prior art because, until the
claimed molecules were actually isolated and purified, it would
have been highly unlikely for one of ordinary skill in the art to
contemplate what was ultimately obtained. What cannot be con-
templated or conceived cannot be obvious.
[K]nowledge of a protein does not give one a conception of a par-
ticular DNA encoding it.178
The argument has some superficial merit. One cannot effec-
175. The term "unique" refers to an amino acid coded for by a single codon. Only two
amino acids (methionine and tryptophane) are specified by such a unique codon.
176. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The use of the term "each" is
probably inadvertent, since the purpose of the example is that only one DNA can possibly en-
code the protein.
177. The same is true when the prior art contains only a partial amino acid sequence. See
id. at 1558-59.
178. Id.
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tively say that a protein encoded by multiple possible DNAs has an
"identical informational content' to its native DNA. Due to the re-
dundancy of the genetic code, some information is lost during the
translation process. A prior protein does not give direct, immediate
conception of its native DNA. However, the prior art contains more
than only the protein. It also contains various gDNA and cDNA li-,
braries (and databases), disclosing scores of natural genomic or ex-
pressed DNAs. Thanks to such libraries, one skilled in the art can
reliably fill the informational gap between a protein and its native
DNA. 179 Hence, while it is true that knowledge of a protein sequence
does not give one a direct and immediate conception of the corre-
sponding native DNA by mere mental processing and without any
experimentation, t 0 it is not true that a DNA cannot possibly be con-
templated or conceived from its corresponding protein sequence. All
it takes is a routine hybridization procedure, soon simplified to a
nearly instantaneous computer search.
Accordingly, the issue in determining obviousness becomes
whether "suggestion in the prior art" requires that the conception of
the new invention be direct and immediate from the prior art. The
court seems to imply the requirement of direct and immediate when it
states, "What cannot be contemplated or conceived cannot be obvi-
ous."' 1 However, obviousness has never required that the new in-
vention be conceived without the slightest testing or experimentation.
All obviousness requires is a reasonable expectation of success. t8 2
Even the enablement requirement of § 112, relating to inventions al-
ready made, prohibits only undue experimentation. Hence, the court
seems to require that the prior art disclose the new invention in a
more than enabling way, before deeming it patentably obvious. This
is certainly not the intent behind § 103. This is, rather, the rationale
behind § 102 on novelty.
The clearest evidence of the confusion in the court's reasoning
179. It also fills the gap between incomplete and complete amino acid sequences, since
hybridization can occur unambiguously with partial sequences. The minimal size for probes is
typically 15 to 25 residues (15 to 25-mers oligonucleotides), depending on the size of the li-
brary screened.
180. For example, expressed as a formula on a paper.
181. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
182. See In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("For obviousness under
§ 103, all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success."); See also Amgen Inc., v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Sun, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In the chemical field, see In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) and In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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is probably the use, in an obviousness context, of the term and notion
of "conception." Under U.S. law, conception is part of the determi-
nation of who among two or more independent inventors deserves the
patent for a single invention. The patent is granted to the first to con-
ceive the invention, provided he is subsequently diligent in reducing
it to practice. 83 Accordingly, conception is an important notion for
establishing priority in interference proceedings. 184
However, conception has nothing to do with obviousness, unless
one wants to equate the latter with novelty. In the DNA field, con-
ception occurs only at the same time as reduction to practice, or full
invention of the claimed DNA.18 Conception helps in deciding who
among several inventors is the first to invent a DNA. Conception
does not help in deciding what is the minimal distance between the
prior art and a new invention necessary to make it nonobvious and
patentable. Accordingly, unlike conception, obviousness of a DNA,
does not require that the prior art fully discloses it. The very use of
the notion of "reasonable expectation of success" in obviousness de-
terminations confirms that point, allowing for some initial uncer-
tainty in the actual conception/reduction to practice of an obvious in-
vention.
By confusing obviousness and conception, the court implies that
obviousness does indeed require an absolute expectation of success.
It also decides that a DNA not yet invented cannot be obvious. Both
positions are clearly erroneous.
Beyond merely legalistic arguments, the best proof that transla-
tion DNAs are currently obvious to those skilled in the art is evi-
denced by the researchers' very attitudes. Today, if a researcher'dis-
covers a new protein and its probable properties, he usually will not
publicize the information until he has found the corresponding gene.
To explain this behavior in a community whose mottois "publish or
perish," one must realize that it would be obvious to another research
team to pick up the information and clone the gene.
Whatever its legal or logical flaws, In re Deuel is currently the
183. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988). The United States has a first-to-invent system for prior-
ity, in contrast to the rest of the developed world, which has a first-to-file system. Unlike the
patent term which was extended to 20 years from the date of filing, the first-to-invent system
has not yet been changed to a first-to-file system as a result of the U.S. GATT negotiations.
184. Due to its first-to-invent system, U.S. law provides a procedure directed to resolving
patent "interferences", i.e., determining whom of two alleged inventors is actually the first to
invent the claimed subject matter and deserves the patent.
185. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See also Fiddes v.
Baird, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1483 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993).
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law. One should nevertheless be conscious that this decision is more
consistent with the pro-patent stance of the Federal Circuit and the
interests of the industry, rather than with established patent law. 8 6
B. "Molecular Modification ": Second Generation Proteins
and DNAs
The second category of recombinant inventions concerns DNAs
or proteins obtained by molecular modification, hence involving a
conception process most similar to traditional chemistry. As in tra-
ditional chemistry, the principle is to start from a prior art molecule
and modify it incrementally until some advantageous property is
found. Instead of small organic molecules, the starting material is a
protein or a DNA sequence. 87 Instead of substituting chemical radi-
cals (adding or subtracting) the molecular modification of proteins
(or DNAs) involves substituting (adding or subtracting) one or more
amino acids (or nucleotides). Even though amino acids or nucleo-
tides are bigger "building blocks" than typical chemical radicals,
proteins and DNAs are also bigger when compared to typical chemi-
cal compounds. As a result, the modifications can still be considered
"incremental" while preserving the underlying presumption that
similar compounds have similar properties in the context of proteins
and DNAs. 88 In addition, similar to chemical radicals, amino acids
or nucleotides have by themselves no independent meaning or func-
tion outside the context of the macromolecule. As a result, the effect
of their substitution, addition, or subtraction on the properties of the
modified molecule (second generation protein) cannot be predicted.
It follows that if any advantageous property arises from the modifi-
cation, it will be an unexpected property or result which can be prop-
186. Those close to the industry reacted cheerfully to the Federal Circuit decision. See,
e.g., Bisbee, supra note 174, at 1, 12. See also Special Panel Discussion (Bay Area Bioscience
Center), The Implications ofln re Deuel: Patenting Genes Made Easier, A Win for the Biotech
Industry? (April 18, 1995).
187. Since ultimate properties lie more often in proteins than DNAs, the material directly
undergoing molecular modification will often be a protein.
188. "[M]any of the amino acids in proteins are not essential, and when they are replaced
by somewhat similar amino acids, the proteins often retain full activity." JAMES D. WATSON
ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 436 (4th ed. 1987). This does not mean that the
presumption ultimately proves valid in all cases. Substituting only one amino acid in a protein
can have dramatic consequences (e.g., substitution of Val for Glu at position 6 of the B-globin
chain in haemoglobin causes sickle cell anemia). The same is also true from smaller molecules
(e.g., closely related opiates molecules have agonist or antagonist effects). If the presumption
was always valid, no compound obtained by molecular modification could ever be patentable
because its properties would never be "unexpected" under In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381
(C.C.P.A. 1963).
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erly used to rebut the prima facie obviousness case based on struc-
tural similarity.
As a result, the obviousness analysis developed for traditional
chemistry case law applies without major problems to second gen-
eration proteins (DNAs) obtained by molecular modification.
If one follows the pattern described above for determining obvi-
ousness in traditional chemicals, one can see that second generation
proteins189 obtained by molecular modification of prior art proteins
will often be found prima facie obvious. Along the lines of Hass-
Henze,190 second generation proteins will generally be considered as
structurally similar to the prior art protein from which they are de-
rived by incremental amino acid modifications. Since the prior art
protein will often have some in vivo property, according to Stemnin-
sky-Dillon,' 9' it will constitute a sufficient general suggestion or mo-
tivation to make minor modifications leading to the second genera-
tion protein. Site-directed mutagenesis or, alternatively, total
chemical synthesis certainly constitutes enabling methods of making
second generation proteins along the lines of In re Hoeksema.192 As a
result, second generation proteins will generally be found prima facie
obvious. However, for the reasons mentioned above, any significant
change in properties from the prior art protein will generally be un-
expected in the meaning of In re Papesch, giving the applicant an
opportunity to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness, and obtain a
patent covering the second generation protein.193 The situation is
summarized in Table 3.
189. Except when noted, what is said about second generation proteins is also valid for
their encoding DNA.
190. See supra Part II.B.La (discussing Hass-Henze line of cases).
191. See supra Part II.B.l.b (discussing Stemninsky-Dillon line of cases).
192. 399 F.2d269 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
193. When a DNA is claimed instead of the corresponding second generation protein, the
properties of the protein itself are indirectly considered as the properties of the DNA. See Ex
parte Anderson, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1866 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1994).
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TYPE OF IN- STATUTORY INVENTION IS FACTOR USUALLY
VENTION DISPOSITION "OBVIOUS TO A REDEEMING
APPLICABLE SKILLED PERSON" PATENTABILITY
IF PRIOR ART ("PRIMA FACIE"
PROVIDES REBUTTAL)
("PRIMA FACIE"
OBVIOUSNESS)
Second generation 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): structurally similar unexpected prop-
proteins and DNAs "A patent may not compound(s) erties in the new
obtained by mo- be obtained.., if + compound
lecular modifica- the... subject motivation to make
tion matter... would the new compound
(idem traditional have been obvious (i.e., some useful
chemical com- to a person having property in the
pounds) ordinary skill in the prior art con-
art .... " pound)
+
enabling disclosure
of a method to
make the new
compound
Table 3. Obviousness of second generation proteins and DNAs
(obtained by molecular modification).
The case law on obviousness of second generation proteins or
DNAs is consistent with this pattern and shows that the claimed
molecules often lack the unexpected properties required to rebut a
prima facie obviousness case. Exparte Anderson194 offers a good il-
lustration of this situation and will be discussed briefly.
The applicant claimed a DNA sequence encoding for mature
human interleukin-3 (IL-3), whereas the prior art disclosed another
DNA sequence encoding for a similar IL-3. The only difference be-
tween the two DNA sequences was the amino acid proline at position
8 of IL-3 -the prior art DNA encoded a serine at the same position.
Quoting Watson's textbook, 95 the PTO Board first affirms the valid-
ity, in the context of proteins, of the presumption that similar com-
pounds have similar properties:
[A]s a matter of textbook chemistry, a single variation in the amino
acid structure of a protein does not normally change the activity and
194. Id.
195. See supra note 3.
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function of the protein unless the single variation is in a critical re-
gion of the protein. Accordingly, the examiner was technologically
correct when she stated that the substitution of any one of the amino
acids in the protein chain and the similar substitution of the DNA
coding for the amino acid would not normally have been expected
to have a significant effect on the activity of the protein. 196
The PTO Board then considered that a new protein (and its cor-
responding DNA) differing only by one amino acid (or a DNA
codon) can be considered as "structurally similar" to the prior art's
protein and DNA:
When one steps back and views the twisted structure of the protein
as a whole, and considering the overall similarity of the protein of
the prior art versus that coded for by the DNA claimed herein,...
and also considers the similarity of the DNA of the prior art versus
that claimed herein, the minor change in the chemical configura-
tion or design of the molecule discovered or made by appellants is
so negligible that a prima facie case of obviousness exists. In legal
parlance, on the record herein appellants' structural modification is
de minimis.197
Noting that the prior art gives sufficient motivation to make
variants of TL-3, the Board reaffirmed the requirements for a prima
facie obviousness case, citing In re Dillon:
[S]tructural similarity between claimed and prior art subject mat-
ter, proved by combining references or otherwise, where the prior
art gives reason or motivation to make the claimed compositions,
creates aprimafacie case of obviousness... the burden (and op-
portunity) then falls on an applicant to rebut that prima facie
case.
198
Finally, the PTO Board found that the applicant had not rebutted
the prima facie case, having demonstrated no unexpected properties
in his product. Note that for prima facie obviousness rebuttal pur-
poses, the PTO takes into consideration the properties of the protein
encoded by the claimed DNA, attributing them to those of the DNA
itself:
In the case before us, appellants are claiming a DNA and the
use of that DNA. What is of concern in the consideration of re-
buttal evidence are the properties of the DNA itself and/or the
product it produces, i.e., the protein it codes for. Appellants have
196. Id. at 1868.
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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not provided evidence that the protein coded for by the claimed
DNA is any different from that of the prior art in its chemical
properties. 199
Cases prior to Exparte Anderson reach the same conclusion. In
Ex parte Thim,2°° the applicant claimed a proinsulin having a C-
peptide201 encompassing only two amino acids, selected from Arg-
Lys, Lys-Lys, and Lys-Arg. The prior art disclosed natural proinsu-
lin having a C-peptide encompassing thirty amino acids, proinsulins
with a C-peptide as short as two amino acids (Arg-Arg), and the ad-
vantage of having a short C-peptide chain for good expression yields.
The examiner considered the claimed proinsulin prima facie obvious.
In his attempted rebuttal case, the applicant showed that the yield of
the claimed proinsulin expressed in yeast was greater than that of the
prior art proinsulin. The PTO Board decided that such a difference in
yield did not constitute an unexpected property able to rebut the
prima facie case of obviousness and rejected the application. Thim
constitutes an example in biotechnology practice where a difference
in degree of a property is considered insufficient to rebut a prima fa-
cie case of obviousness. 202
In Exparte Gray,203 the applicant claimed human B-NGF204 with
an additional N-terminal methionyl residue.20 Having found that B-
NGF itself was part of the prior art, the PTO Board considered that
N-met-B-NGF was structurally similar.206 Reaffirming the presump-
tion that structurally similar compounds have similar properties, the
Board held that methionyl-B-NGF was prima facie obvious and that
the applicant had not rebutted this finding. The Board stated "the
mere presence of a single methionyl moiety in a sequence of over
199. Exparte Anderson, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1866, 1869 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1994).
200. 22 U.$.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991).
201. Human insulin itself is composed of two peptides termed A and B chains, held to-
gether by sulfide linkages. It is not produced as such; it is initially produced as a single
polypeptide chain called proinsulin, in which chains A and B are connected by a C
("connecting") chain which is excised later during post-translational processes.
202. For equivalent cases in chemical practice, see In re Lohr, 317 F.2d 388 (C.C.P.A.
1963); In re Lunsford, 357 F.2d 380 (C.C.P.A. 1966); In re Wagner, 371 F.2d 877 (C.C.P.A.
1967); In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also discussion supra Part II.B.2.
203. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
204. NGF means Nerve Growth Factor.
205. A N-terminal methionyl residue is generally the result of recombinant expression
systems.
206. Exparte Gray, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1925-27 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
Gray had also claimed natural 13-NGF, which the PTO Board found alternatively anticipated or
obvious from the prior art. See id. at 1923.
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100 amino acids would not have been expected to alter the properties
of the compound in a significant respect, in the absence of evidence
of the contrary." 207
On request for reconsideration, the court stated, "appellants have
failed to respond to our finding that the protein containing the termi-
nal methionyl group is substantially identical in structure to that
[disclosed by prior art references]. 208
The same conclusion involving an N-terminal methionyl residue
is reached in a European patent application by Monsanto. 209 The ap-
plicant claimed a method for increasing bovine milk production by
administering recombinant bovine growth hormone (bGI-), instead of
natural bGH as disclosed by the prior art. The amino acid sequences
in both recombinant and natural bGH were identical, except for an
additional N-terminal methionyl residue in the recombinant version.
The European Patent Office Technical Board of Appeal decided that
the claimed method using recombinant bGH involved no inventive
step,210 since its result was reasonably expected. Although the deci-
sion deals with a method of using bGH and not directly with bGI as
a product, both claimed and prior art methods differ only in the prod-
uct (bGH) used in the method; accordingly, the conclusions also ap-
ply to the product itself.
Another European case, Biogen,2t" deals with a new version of
a-interferon. Although the decision does not mention how different
the claimed IFN-a2 is from the prior art IFN-al, it clearly states that
both DNA sequences were close.2 2 Examining the issue further, the
Technical Board decided that IFN-a2 represented an inventive step
over IFN-al because, despite its structural similarity, it had an an-
tiviral activity at least thirty times higher. Explained in terms of U.S.
law, this increase in activity would have represented an unexpected
property (or a difference in degree of a same property amounting to
an unexpected property) sufficient to rebut the prima facie case of
207. Id. at 1926.
208. Id. at 1928.
209. Monsanto, Method for improved bovine milk production, T 249/88, dec. 14 Feb.
1989 (unpublished), cited in HANS-RAINER JAENICHEN, THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE'S
CASE LAW ON THE PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS 118 (1993). See also R.
Stephen Crespi, Inventiveness in Biological Chemistry: an International Perspective, 73 J. PAT
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 351 (1991) (citing same case).
210. "Inventive step" is the equivalent ofnonobviousness in European terminology.
211. Biogen, "alpha-interferons," T 301/87, dec. 16 Feb. 1989, EPOR 190 (1990).
212. Id. at 195.
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obviousness based on structural similarity.213
In addition to minor variations in their amino acid sequence,
proteins can also differ by their glycosylation patterns. Because their
functional impact is generally negligible at the current level of under-
standing, different versions of a same protein differing only in the
glycosylation pattern are generally treated as "structurally similar."
This is so because the presumption that "similar" compounds have
similar properties remains valid in this context even with such an
extended definition of "structural similarity." Accordingly, the obvi-
ousness analysis applied in traditional chemistry applies to proteins
having various glycosylation patterns without major problems.
Similar to the examples of second generation proteins mentioned
previously, they will generally be considered prima facie obvious,
unless the applicant rebuts the finding by showing some unexpected
property.
Again, the case law shows that demonstrating unexpected prop-
erties in differently glycosylated versions of a same protein is usually
difficult. In Exparte Gray,2t 4 the applicant claimed both natural and
N-terminal methionyl-NGF. Both were apparently produced using a
procaryotic expression system, meaning they had no glycosylation
pattern, as opposed to the prior art purified natural NGF. Despite this
difference, both were found obvious over the purified NGF.215 Con-
sistent with the presumption that structurally similar compounds have
similar properties, the fact that the unglycosylated NGF retained its
properties was not considered "unexpected. '216
In contrast, in certain circumstances the prior art may rebut the
presumption and render any retained properties unexpected. Exparte
Aggarwal217 is such a case. Aggarwal claimed a method of treating
tumors in animals by administering recombinant lymphotoxin pro-
duced in various expression systems. The prior art disclosed the
same method using purified natural lymphotoxins. In spite of other
213. As already noted, the same obviousness issues arise in both European and U.S. law
despite some variations in terminology. See discussion supra Part ll.B. and supra note 190.
214. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1923 (Rd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
215. Obvious, or even anticipated by natural NGF. The text of the decision in Ex parte
Gray is not clear on the §103 or §102/103 grounds of the rejection. Ex parte Gray, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922 (1d. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
216. The same observation could be made in Monsanto, where the N-terminal-met bGH
used in the claimed method was certainly unglycosylated, and the natural bGH used in the
prior art method certainly was. See supra Part II.B.l.a (discussing structural similarity).
217. 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992).
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problems,2 8 the PTO Board successively examined the obviousness
of the claims on methods using recombinant lymphotoxins having
various glycosylation patterns. It first decided that the claims related
to glycosylated lymphotoxins expressed in eucaryotic systems
(human, non-human mammalian, yeast cells) were obvious, because
the variations observed in their glycosylation patterns were minor
when compared to the glycosylation pattern of the prior art purified
protein and would not render the cytotoxic property of the protein
unexpected. Conversely, the Board decided that the claims related to
the unglycosylated lymphotoxin expressed in procaryotic systems
such as E. coli were nonobvious, because unlike in Ex parte Gray,
there were prior art references indicating that the glycosylation pat-
tern played a definite role in the conformation of lymphotoxin and
was necessary for its properties. In other words, cytotoxic activity in
an unglycosylated lymphotoxin was considered as an unexpected
property and therefor would be proper to rebut the prima facie case of
obviousness:
The examiner has requested this Board to follow Ex parte
Gray, and affrm the examiner's rejection in its entirety.
We have followed Gray, with regard to the obviousness of
using a glycosylated recombinant lymphotoxin for treating
tumors. However, this case is distinguishable because,
unlike Gray, there is evidence of record herein which indi-
cates that the unglycosylated lymphotoxin would not have
been expected to retain its cytotoxic activity.2 19
There is no case law in the recombinant field dealing directly
with the patentability of a protein or a DNA which shares, in addition
to a new and unexpected property, significant common properties
with prior art proteins or DNAs. As long as the claimed molecule is
structurally similar to prior art compounds (i.e., differ only incre-
mentally), there is no reason to question the applicability of the tra-
ditional chemical case law.2 0 The prospect is clearly different for the
proteins and DNAs described in the next section.22'
218. The application was primarily rejected on 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) and 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1988) grounds.
219. Exparte Aggarwal, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334, 1337 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992).
220. See In re De Montmollin, 344 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055
(C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re May, 574 F.2d 1082
(C.C.P.A. 1978). See also discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
221. Ignoring the distinction made here between "molecular modification" and
"combination" macromolecular inventions, an author points out the difficulties in applying the
"balancing" doctrine for common properties. However, his objection is valid only for
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Another type of "second generation" protein and DNA can be
designed by a very different process. Instead of substituting (adding,
or subtracting) per se meaningless amino acids or glycosylation pat-
terns prior art proteins or substituting nucleotides to prior art DNAs,
these proteins and DNAs are designed by substituting (adding or
subtracting) functional domains.222 Such "second generation" pro-
teins and DNAs will be considered as "combination" inventions and
discussed in the following section.
C "Combination'" Inventions: DNA Vectors and Second
Generation Proteins/DNAs Combining Heterogeneous
Functional Domains
Both traditionally designed chemical compounds and second
generation DNAs or proteins described in the preceding section are
conceived by the same approach: incremental molecular modifica-
tion of prior art compounds. In such cases, the substituted, added, or
subtracted chemical elements are proportionately small, and the
modified molecule preserves the general structure of the starting
molecule. As a result, the structures of both products are similar, and
chances are that their properties are similar as well. Given this pre-
sumption, any significant change in properties in the resulting prod-
uct will be unexpected, and hence apt to rebut a prima facie obvious-
ness finding based on structural similarity.
Even though they can ultimately change the properties of the
whole compound dramatically, the chemical elements substituted,
added, or subtracted in traditional molecular modification have no
autonomous significance or function. The advent of biotechnology in
general, and of recombinant technology specifically, has enabled the
scientist to substitute, add, or subtract bigger chemical elements
having a known autonomous function or meaning. DNA regulatory
sequences and partial amino acid sequences recognized as functional
domains or epitopes are examples of such elements. The contribution
of the inventor to such "combination" macromolecules resides in the
very combination of prior art functional elements directed toward a
specific purpose and not in the nearly blind modification of a prior art
chemical formula. In this context, and in contrast to the traditional
molecular modification approach, the designer does not generally
"combination" inventions. Sean Johnston, Patent Protection for the Protein Products of Re-
combinant DNA, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 263 (1989).
222. Or other amino acid or nucleotide sequences known to be responsible for some prop-
erty independent of the macromolecule in which they are ultimately integrated. A functional
domain is a region of a protein, known for performing some basic function of the protein.
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need to carry out experiments in order to discover the potential new
and unexpected properties of its product. Rather, because the prior art
chemical elements he substitutes, adds, or subtracts have an autono-
mous significance, the inventor can directly envision what structure
he should give to his invention to confer upon it the properties which
will resolve the specific problem he has in mind. Accordingly, the
conferred properties will by definition not be unexpected, and will
offer no remedy in case the combination invention is found prima fa-
cie obvious by the PTO.
In this respect, inventors of "combination macromolecules" are
in a situation comparable to that of inventors of mechanical devices,
where most inventions are combinations of prior art elements, and
precisely designed ex ante to bear the properties able to resolve a
specific problem - function precedes structure. Despite the often re-
peated stance that biotechnology products are only chemical com-
pounds, "combination macromolecules" arguably represent the point
(on the size rule) where reasoning along the lines of mechanical in-
ventions becomes more sensible than reasoning along the lines of
traditional chemical inventions. The fact that biotechnology is, for
historical reasons, linked more closely to chemistry than to mechan-
ics should not matter. Any tangible matter could ultimately be
viewed as a "chemical compound," mechanical inventions included.
The relevant point for obviousness analysis is that such inventions
involve the combination of meaningful operating elements from the
prior art, in contrast to the (nearly) blind substitution, addition or
subtraction of per se meaningless radicals. While the contribution of
the inventor to a molecular modification invention resides in creating
some part of an amino acid or nucleotide sequence or of a chemical
formula, the contribution of the inventor of combination macromole-
cules resides in the specific combination of old elements, each having
an independent significance or function and directed to solve a spe-
cific problem.m1
In this context, the criteria developed in traditional chemistry to
establish suggestion or motivation in the prior art (structural similar-
ity as in Hass-Henze plus known property in the prior art from
Stemninsky-Dillon) make little sense.224 For the purpose of obvious-
223. Even the terminology used by those skilled in the field - plasmid or vector construc-
tion - seems to confirm the analogy with mechanical inventions. No chemist synthesizing new
compounds by molecular modification would ever use the same term.
224. Suggestion or motivation is intended here in its broader sense. See discussion supra
Part. II.B.1 .b.
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ness determination, comparing the chemical structure of two plasmid
vectors bearing different functional elements makes no more sense
than comparing the chemical structure of two types of can openers.
Accordingly, instead of the traditional structural similarity inquiry
which leads to absurd results in this context, the same test used in
mechanical inventions combining old elements should be adopted for
combination macromolecule inventions. As already mentioned, since
1982, the Federal Circuit has considerably clarified the test for de-
termining obviousness in inventions combining old elements. Com-
pletely dismissing the Supreme Court's "synergistic results" rule, the
Federal Circuit requires that for a combination invention to be obvi-
ous, the suggestion or motivation to make the specific combination
must be found in the prior art.m Although the suggestion does not
need to be express or specific,226 it certainly must go beyond the gen-
eral suggestion provided in traditional chemistry by the mere knowl-
edge of a property in a structural analog, as spelled out in the Heinz-
Henze and Stemninsky-Dillon line of cases. Robert Harmon ade-
quately summarizes the position of the Federal Circuit about inven-
tions combining old elements. Citing a long line of cases,227 he
writes: "There must be something in the prior art as a whole to sug-
gest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combi-
nation."2 8 Indeed, the most powerful (and most frequently used) ar-
gument to obtain a patent on a combination invention is to show that
the prior art does not provide suggestion or motivation to make the
combination:
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist and Der-
rick Compan a2 9 provides a good example, in the mechanical field, of
the Federal Circuit's position regarding combination inventions. The
patent was directed to a hydraulic scrap shear which was able to
process "rigidly massive" scrap metal. Unlike prior art devices, the
shear featured two rams on different working surfaces. When light
225. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
226. See Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
See also the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Nies in In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir.
1992). In biotechnology, the Federal Circuit seems to require greater specificity in the prior art
suggestion of the combination than in other fields. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See also In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In re Nunberg, 40 F.3d 1250
(1994).
227. See In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH
v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
228. ROBERTL. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 108 (2d ed.1991).
229. 730 F.2d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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scrap was fed into the machine, both rams would advance together to
crush and compact the scrap. However, when rigid scrap was fed, the
two rams were quickly brought to a standstill by the scrap's resis-
tance; the smaller ram then operated independently of the main ram,
crushing the rigid scrap with greater force thanks to its smaller sur-
face. In a suit brought for infringement of the patent covering the
shear, the defendant asserted that the patent was invalid for obvious-
ness. The district court agreed, finding both small-ram and large-ram
machines in the prior art:
Plaintiff simply put the two features in the same machine and con-
nected them as was necessary depending on whether the scrap was
small or large. It used a known connection idea. The '315
[patented] machine possessed one known feature to operate in a
known way to produce a known result to deal with the first scrap
situation and another known feature operating in a known manner
to produce a known result to deal with the second. Clearly, this
was an obvious solution using already appreciated or obvious fea-
tures to solve the problem of how to develop a machine that could
handle both types of scrap most economically.2 0
The Federal Circuit reversed, insisting that the combination it-
self must be suggested in the prior art:
The '315 patent specifically stated that it disclosed and claimed a
combination of features previously used in two separate devices.
That fact alone is not fatal to patentability. The claimed invention
must be considered as a whole, and the question is whether there is
something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability,
and thus the obviousness, of making the combination. That ques-
tion must here be answered in the negative331
When the prior art does provide adequate suggestion to make the
combination, an additional factor might still render the combination
nonobvious. The absence of an enabling method for producing the
invention can redeem nonobviousness and patentability, as seen in In
re Hoeksema.22 However, the argument will rarely apply to mo-
lecular combination inventions, since enabling methods for making
both plasmids and composite proteins are now generally available.23
3
230. Id. at 1460.
231. Id.
232. 399 F.2d 269,274 (C.C.P.A. 1968). See discussion supra Part II.B.I.c.
233. Plasmid construction by using restriction enzymes (enzymes that break DNA mole-
cules at specific nucleotide sequences) is now a mature technique. Similar methods can be
used to engineer the encoding DNA of a combination protein. Note that "enabling method" is
understood here as a method allowing one to obtain the wanted structure, independent of its
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As to the notion of unexpected properties, so useful to rebut
prima facie obviousness in traditional chemistry and second genera-
tion proteins, it has already been noted that it offers little help in
combination inventions designed from inception to have definite
properties and solve a specific problem. For example, a mechanical
device combining several prior art mechanical elements will rarely
have unexpected properties or results, since it was designed precisely
to have properties able to perform a specific task. The same is true
for combination macromolecules.3 4 The treatment of recombinant
combination inventions is summarized in Table 4:
TYPE O N- STATUTORY INVENTION IS FACTOR USUALLY
VENTION DISPOSITION "OBVIOUS TO A REDEEMING
APPLICABLE SKILLED PERSON" PATENTABILITY
IF PRIOR ART
PROVIDES
Combination in- 35 U.S.C. §103(a): all elements of the no adequate sug-
ventions "A patent may not combination gestion to make
(mechanical and be obtained... if + the combination
recombinant combi- the... subject suggestion to make or
nation inventions) matter... would the combination no reasonable ex-
have been obvious pectation of suc-
to a person having cess
ordinary skill in
the art ......
Table 4. Obviousness of combination inventions.
The available case law concerning macromolecular combination
inventions confirms this analysis, focusing both on the prior art moti-
vation to make the combination and on the reasonable expectation of
success in practicing the invention.
In 1988, the Federal Circuit decided In re O'Farrell,235 a land-
mark case on obviousness in biotechnology. The applicant claimed a
method of producing proteins in bacteria using a new plasmid.23 6 The
ultimate properties.
234. Admittedly, because the understanding ofintracellular events is not absolute, there is
more room for "unexpected properties" in combination macromolecules than in mechanics,
However, the current case law concerning combinations macromolecules never mention
"unexpected properties". This tends to confirm the view exposed here that the properties of
combination macromolecules are by definition not "unexpected".
235. 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
236. The decision in In re O'Farrell only mentions a method, despite the title of the patent
19973 RECOMBINANT PRODUCTS & NONOBVIOUSNESS 61
latter combined homologous regulatory DNA sequences, a portion of
a homologous gene expressed under the control of the homologous
regulatory sequences and lacking the normal gene termination signal,
and a heterologous DNA sequence encoding for a protein of interest.
The homologous regulatory sequences were intended to control the
production of the heterologous protein. A paper describing early re-
sults of the applicant's research team was published more than one
year before the patent application, constituting prior art.3 7 Using the
same strategy as the claimed method (linking a foreign gene to a
highly regulated indigenous gene), the experiment described in the
anticipating paper expressed an aberrant protein resulting from the
expression of a ribosomal DNA,1 8 instead of a normally expressed
protein as described in the patent application. The paper explicitly
mentioned the interest of using a functional eukaryotic gene for pro-
tein expression, instead of the ribosomal DNA. The court found the
invention obvious from the reference; the court observed that "the
prior art explicitly suggested the substitution that is the difference
between the claimed invention and the prior art ..... 239
In other words, the reference suggested combining the elements
of the invention. As a result, the "suggestion test" described above
for combination inventions was met. Answering to the applicant's
contention that it had used an improper "obvious to try" standard, the
court then held that the prior art not only suggested the specific com-
bination invention but also provided evidence that it would be rea-
sonably successful.240 Observing that obviousness does not require
absolute predictability of success, the court said that the applicants
had a reasonable expectation of success in practicing their invention,
which rendered the latter obvious from the prior art reference.241
application: "Method and Hybrid Vector for Regulating Translation of Heterologous DNA in
Bacteria." However, the issues are identical for both the method and the vector itself. This is
confirmed by the decisions T 0292/85 and T 0293/85 of the European Patent Office Technical
Board of Appeal, concerning equivalent applications, respectively claiming the method and the
vectors claimed in In re O'Farrell.
237. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b): "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless... the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication ... more than one year prior to the date of
the application .... 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
238. Ribosomes are subcellular components involved in the translation of RNA into pro-
teins. They are themselves composed of proteins and RNA, called ribosomal RNA (rRNA).
Accordingly, this rRNA is not intended to be translated into protein, like mRNA's. In the ex-
periment reported in the prior art paper, a DNA encoding for a ribosomal RNA was used to
lead to the expression of an aberrant protein.
239. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
240. Id. at 902.
241. Id. at 903.
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Interestingly, the very same application, encompassing the same
prior art, went before the European Patent Office Technical Board of
Appeal and was judged nonobvious and patentable.242 The European
Board based its decision on two limitations of the claims, which were
also present in the claims before the USPTO. The first limitation in-
sisted on a proper reading frame for the inserted heterologous gene,
and the second mentioned a sufficient size for the expressed protein
in order to avoid proteolytic degradation. None of these limitations
were mentioned in the anticipating reference, since it used a ribo-
somal gene normally not translated into protein after transcription.243
The European Board found these distinctions important enough to
confer nonobviousness, hence patentability, to the invention. In other
words, it considered that the prior art did not adequately suggest the
limitations, and therefore, did not render the invention obvious. The
Federal Circuit reacted differently to the reading frame limitation,
where it considered that "the importance of orientation and reading
frame was- well known in the prior art ..... ,244 In case the reading
frame had to be modified, a technique existed, which "could be used
to shift the sequence of the DNA inserted into a plasmid into the
proper reading frame."24  The Federal Circuit decision does not
mention the minimal size of the expressed protein required to avoid
proteolytic degradation. The contrary decisions by the USPTO and
the European Patent Board based on identical facts and very similar
law demonstrates show how subjective the evaluation of an adequate
prior art suggestion can be.
More recently, the Federal Circuit decided In re Vaeck,246 an-
other case concerning a DNA combination invention. The applicant
claimed a hybrid DNA sequence (plasmid) combining a Bacillus-
derived gene encoding for an insecticidal protein and a DNA pro-
moter effective for expressing foreign genes (such as the Bacillus
gene) in a cyanobacterium. 247 Both genes were separately disclosed
in the prior art, as well as the expression in cyanobacterium of a for-
eign protein (CAT), using another promoter. The PTO Board had
judged that substituting insecticidal Bacillus genes for CAT was ob-
242. GENETECHI/Polypeptide Expression, 4 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 1, 17 (1989).
243. Thus, neither the reading frame nor the size of the protein really mattered.
244. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 902.
245. Id.
246. 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
247. Id. at 490. Expressing insecticidal proteins in cyanobacteria is interesting because
the latter grows on top of swamps where they are consumed by mosquitoes and flies. Id. at
489.
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vious in light of the prior art.248 The Federal Circuit reversed, finding
no suggestion of the combination in the prior art:
The prior art simply does not disclose or suggest the expression in
cyanobacteria of a chimeric gene encoding an insecticidally active
protein .... More particularly, there is no suggestion in ... the
primary reference cited against all claims [disclosing CAT expres-
sion in cyanobacteria], of substituting in the disclosed plasmid a
structural gene encoding Bacillus insecticidal proteins for the CAT
gene utilized for selection purposes.249
The court in In re Vaeck seems to require a fairly specific sug-
gestion in the prior art before finding a DNA combination invention
obvious. It distinguished In re O'Farrell from In re Vaeck precisely
on that point, noting that in the former case the prior art explicitly
suggested the combination invention. As already noted, this re-
quirement is somewhat in contrast to the case law on combination in-
ventions pertaining to other fields, where the suggestion need not be
as specific.2 0 However, this appears to be the law for biotechnology
combination inventions, for the Federal Circuit recently repeated the
reasoning in In re Nunberg,251 a case similar to In re O'Farrell:
The Board's reliance on Backman's suggestion distinguishes this
case from cases lacking an explicit suggestion of the claimed proc-
ess. For example, in In re Vaeck, this court reversed the obvious-
ness rejection of claims not suggested by the prior art. Vaeck
claimed expression of an insecticidal protein in cyanobacteria.
The prior art taught only expression of an antibiotic enzyme. The
prior art did not suggest substituting the insecticide gene for the
248. Id. at 492.
249. Id. at 493.
250. See, e.g., the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Nies in In re Oetiker, a mechanical
case:
I agree ... that there must be some teaching, reason, suggestion, 'or motivation
found "in the prior art" or "in the prior art references" to make a combination to
render an invention obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
Similar language appears in a number of opinions and if taken literally would
mean that an invention cannot be held to have been obvious unless something
specific in a prior art reference would lead an inventor to combine the teaching
therein with another piece of prior art.
This restrictive understanding ... is clearly wrong ....
While there must be some teaching, reason, suggestion, or motivation to com-
bine existing elements to produce the claimed device, it is not necessary that the
cited references or prior art specifically suggest making the combination."
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447-48 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies, C.J., concurring).
251. In re Nunberg, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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antibiotic gene.
This case is very different. Backman teaches that "our method
should be applicable" as Nunberg claims. Backman thus makes an
explicit suggestion to practice the claimed process. 2s2
The repeated use of the word "explicit" is significant. Although
the absence of suggestion was in itself sufficient to decide for non-
obviousness, the court in In re Vaeck also found no reasonable ex-
pectation of success in practicing the invention, without elaborat-
ing. 53
In Ex parte Browne,2s4 the PTO Board also examined the prior
art suggestion to make a DNA combination invention in determining
obviousness. In this complex case, the applicant had devised a DNA
vector replicative in both bacterial and animal cells, which included
SV40 early gene sequences but no late gene sequences.255 In addi-
tion, the vector included two restriction sites, one for the insertion of
an heterologous gene whose expression is wanted and the other for
the insertion of SV40 late gene sequence which is able to render the
vector lytic. The examiner had rejected the application as obvious
from prior art references disclosing various lytic and nonlytic SV40
vectors. The PTO Board reversed, because none of these references
specifically disclosed the "insertion of an SV40 functional region
into a vector containing an exogenous gene to render it lytic. 256 In
other words, the prior art did not suggest or motivate the inventor to
make the claimed combination of prior art DNA sequences, which
accordingly was nonobvious, and thus patentable. Similar to In re
Vaeck, the PTO Board seems to require a fairly specific prior art sug-
gestion before finding the combination invention obvious.
252. Id. at 1955 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
253. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488,495 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Although the Court did not directly
elaborate on the lack of reasonable expectation of success, support for this finding can be
found in its discussion about the lack of suggestion. Denying that the prior cloning of insecti-
cidal proteins into bacteria would suggest doing the same in cyanobacteria, the Court stressed
the differences between both types of organisms and the recent uncertainty about the biology
of cyanobacteria. The same argument could have been used to demonstrate that there was no
reasonable expectation of success in practicing the claimed invention. Id. at 494.
254. 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1605 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988) and 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990). The second decision by the PTO Board confirms and clari-
fies the previous one, which is nearly incomprehensible.
255. Exparte Browne, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1610 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990). SV
stands for simian virus, commonly used as a vector in recombinant DNA technology. Early
and late genes refer to genes expressed at different stages of the virus' life cycle. Late genes
are required for the virus to be lytic.
256. Id. at 1611.
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All the cases mentioned above concern DNA combination in-
ventions. As already noted, proteins combining various functional
domains could be imagined but are not yet a reality in biotechnology
patent practice. 57 Nevertheless, a class of proteins, and they are al-
ready in use could be incorporated into combination inventions.
These are proteins which are portions of larger prior art proteins, in-
dividualized because they represent a functional domain, an epitope,
or any other region able to have an independent function or meaning.
Since the sequence of such protein fragments is included in the se-
quence of larger prior art proteins, the only contribution of the person
who develops them resides in identifying the cleavage points used to
determine the new protein. Accordingly, these proteins can be
viewed as the first step toward proteins combining various functional
domains, because they represent the basic units of such combination
inventions. Since the structure of these proteins as defined by their
amino acid sequence represents only a part of their larger parents, the
inquiry for structural similarity derived from traditional chemistry
makes little sense.
Depending upon how one interprets the notion of structural
similarity, protein fragments could be considered as similar to, or
dissimilar from, their parents. They are similar because their struc-
ture is always "included" in their parent's structure, and they are dis-
similar because their structure is always smaller than their parent's.
The obviousness analysis for such proteins should follow the pattern
used in combination inventions, focusing on whether or not the prior
art provides suggestion or motivation to cleave the prior art protein at
the points determining the new protein. If not, the latter should be
patentable. In practice, many proteins representing fragments of
larger prior art proteins and having an independent meaning or func-
tion have already been patented without problems because nothing in
the prior art suggested cleaving the prior art proteins at the points de-
fining the new ones. For example, Genetic Institute's second gen-
eration tissue plasminogen activator (FE-lX) differs from natural
human t-PA in that it lacks two functional domains and one glycosy-
lation site. Independent of an infringement suit by Genentech, holder
of a patent on natural t-PA,15 FE-iX was issued a patent without dif-
257. Shortly before this article went into publication, the Federal Circuit decided a case
involving a protein combining growth hormone and an enterokinase cleavage site. In re
Mayne, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See infra this Part.
258. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (1990); 798
F.Supp. 213 (D. Del. 1992), rev'd 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Because the two deleted
domains, finger (F) and epidermal growth (E), account in natural tPA for fibrin binding and
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ficulty.259 Other examples include innumerable peptides representing
fragments of HIV surface proteins, patented despite the publication
of the entire nucleotide sequence of IIIV years before.260 The pat-
ented peptides generally represent some domain or region important
for immunogenicity or other functions.26t
Finally, a recent Federal Circuit decision can be viewed as the
first obviousness case directly discussing combination proteins.262
The applicant had claimed a protein combining (1) the amino acid
Met (an unwanted result of translation), (2) an enterokinase cleavage
site (allowing Met to be eliminated), and (3) either human or bovine
growth hormone (intended to be released for pharmacological ac-
tion). The court first observed that growth hormones were in the
prior art and that the enterokinase site in the claimed protein was
structurally obvious -it differed by only one amino acid and was
functionally equivalent to prior art enterokinase sites. In other words,
none of the functionally significant elements of the claimed combi-
nation protein was patentable by itself. The court then found that the
whole protein was prima facie obvious, citing a patent teaching the
fusion of an enterokinase cleavage site to a desired protein. In other
words, the court found that the prior art reference suggested the com-
bination used to make the invention. It should be noted, however,
that the court reached its conclusion even though the reference did
not explicitly suggest the specific combination -here a protein in-
cluding the enterokinase site and human or bovine growth hormone.
This is in contrast with In re Vaeck, In re Nunberg, and Ex parte
Browne,263 where the courts seemed to require a fairly specific sug-
gestion of the combination before an obviousness finding could be
made. This point evidently represents a moving area of the law,
which will have to be clarified in future cases.
because FE-IX is thought to bind fibrin thanks to the glycosylation site deletion, FE-IX was
found not infringing natural human t-PA under the doctrine of equivalents. Although both FE-
IX and t-PA perform substantially the same function (fibrin binding), they do it in a substan-
tially different way (t-PA through the F and E domains, FEIX through the missing glycosyla-
tion site).
259. Glenn R. Larsen, Truncated Thrombolytic Proteins, 1124 OFFICIAL GAZTrE OF THE
U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF. 2164 (March 26, 1991) (No. 5,002,887).
260. Lee Ratner et al., Complete Nucleotide Sequence of the AIDS Virus, HTLV-Ill, 313
NATURE 277 (1985).
261. See, e.g., Lucinda A. Ivanoff& Steven R. Petteway, Human Immunodeiciency Virus
Antigen, 1105 OFFICIAL GAzET- OF THE U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF. 3313 (August 29,
1989) (No. 4,861,707).
262. In re Mayne, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
263. See supra Part III.C (discussing these cases).
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article attempts to clarify the analysis of obviousness for
various recombinant inventions. It shows notably how the rational6
prevailing in traditional chemistry is not valid for all categories of re-
combinant inventions, even though they all can be considered as
"chemical compounds." Accordingly, this article distinguishes three
categories of recombinant inventions: "translation" inventions,
"molecular modification" inventions, and "combination" inventions.
A synopsis of the obviousness analysis for these inventions, as devel-
oped in the text, is presented in Table 5.
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TYPE OF IN- STATUTORY INVENTION IS FACTOR USUALLY
VENTION DISPOSITION "OBVIOUS TO A REDEEMING
APPLICABLE SKILLED PERSON" PATENTABILITY
IF PRIOR ART
PROVIDES
Translation inven-
tions
(DNAs obtained
from the corre-
sponding protein)
Molecular modifi-
cation inventions
(traditional chemi-
cal compounds and
second generation
proteins/ DNAs
obtained by mo-
lecular modifica-
tion)
Combination in-
ventions
(mechanical and
recombinant com-
bination inven-
tions)
35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a):
"A patent may not
be obtained if
the.., subject
matter... would
have been obvious
to a person having
ordinary skill in
the art. .. ."
"basic information"
underlying inven-
tion (protein se-
quence)
+
method of
"translation"
structurally similar
compound(s)
+
motivation to make
the new compound
(i.e., some useful
property in the
prior art com-
pound)
+
enabling disclosure
of a method to
make the new com-
pound
(prima facie obvi-
ousness)
all elements of the
combination
+
suggestion to make
the combination
no reasonable ex-
pectation of suc-
cess of the method
of "translation"
unexpected prop-
erties in the new
compound
or
no proper similar-
ity, motivation, or
disclosure
(prima facie case
rebuttal)
1-
no adequate sug-
gestion to make
the combination
or
no reasonable ex-
pectation of suc-
cess
Table 5. Synopsis.
The first category- "translation" inventions -represents a
new type of invention, rendered possible by the advent of the power-
ful "translation tool" of recombinant technology. If one turns back to
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the original meaning of § 103, one realizes that if some basic infor-
mation is in the prior art, translation inventions obtained by mature
translation technology are obvious under current law. While obvi-
ousness of translation DNAs might not be a problem for much
longer, since developers now tend to keep the underlying basic in-
formation (amino acid sequence) secret until the DNA is found, it is
not the case for other biotechnology products which also potentially
represent translation inventions. Monoclonal antibodies can be
viewed as resulting from the translation of the molecular information
contained in antigens, according to the Kohler-Milstein translation
method. Ligands retrieved by combinatorial library screening on re-
ceptors could also be considered as translation inventions. Accord-
ingly, the broader issues involved in "translation" inventions require
a careful evaluation before any broad decision is made about their
patentability. The Federal Circuit certainly did not make this evalua-
tion before rendering its decision in In re Deuel.
In relation to the two other categories -"molecular modifica-
tion" and "combination" inventions -this article has determined
that the rules developed in chemical and mechanical cases are re-
spectively applicable. Both categories concern proteins or DNAs,
i.e., "chemical compounds." Accordingly, one might wonder why
molecular modification inventions should be considered chemical
compounds for patent law purposes while "combination" inventions
should be considered mechanical devices? The reason lies in the
macromolecular nature of recombinant inventions. As such, they can
be contemplated either as unitary structures (whose internal logic is
not understood) similar to chemical compounds; or as the combina-
tion of autonomous functional units (making sense as a whole struc-
ture) similar to mechanical devices. Due to their intermediate size
(between the atomic scale of chemicals and the microscopic world of
microdevices) recombinant macromolecules represent a versatile
subject matter and should alternatively be assimilated to either one.
Patent law will fulfill its function only by recognizing the specific
nature of these inventions.
The issues discussed in this article provide an example of an
existing law challenged by a major technological change. In such
situations, a true understanding of both the technology and the law is
required to make the right decisions. The typology of recombinant
inventions offered here is a modest attempt toward this goal.

